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COLLATERAL ATTACKS ON
CONVICTIONS: A SURVEY OF
FEDERAL REMEDIES
I.

INTRODUCTION

There are four commonly used avenues for collaterally attacking criminal convictions in federal courts. They are: 28
U.S.C. section 2241, the general habeas corpus statute; 28 U.S.C.
section 2254, the remedy in federal courts for persons attacking
state convictions; 28 U.S.C. section 2255, the remedy for persons
attacking federal convictions; and 28 U.S.C. section 1651, the AllWrits Statute.
Section 2254 is part of the general habeas corpus statute located at 28 U.S.C. section 2241. It provides relief for persons in
custody pursuant to judgment of a state court,' or in custody
pursuant to judgment of either a state or federal court if the at2
tack is on a future state sentence.
Section 2255 provides relief against federal convictions for
persons in federal custody, or for persons in state custody who
challenge a future federal sentence. 3 Because a section 2255
motion is a step in the original criminal proceeding, it must be
brought in the sentencing court. In contrast section 2241 and
2254 proceedings are separate civil proceedings for which more
flexible venue provisions exist.
The general habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. section 2241,
provides relief for persons in custody under the authority of the
United States 4 or who are committed for trial before some court
of the United States, 5 or who are in custody in violation of the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.6 It is avail1. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)(1976).
2. Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts, Rule 1 ("§
2254"). These rules are referred to here as the Habeas Corpus Rules. Two
sets of rules were promulgated--one set for section 2254 cases, and another
set for section 2255 cases. Act of September 28, 1976, Pub. L. 94-426, 90 Stat.

1334. When discussed in the text, the rules will be stated with the section
appearing in paranthesis. The rules as finally a pproved, together with the
Avdsory Committee Notes, appear in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
3. Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings for the U.S. District Courts,
Rule 1 ("§ 2255"). In the text these are referred to as Habeas Corpus Rules
(section 2255). For legislative enactment, see note 2 supra. The rules as
finally approved, together with the Advisory Committee Notes, appear in 28
U.S.C. §2255 (1976).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1)(1976).
5. Id.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)(1976).
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able to state or federal prisoners, but only to federal prisoners
7
when a section 2255 motion is inappropriate or inadequate.
The All-Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. section 1651, makes the old
writ of coram nobis available to persons not in custody who wish
to attack federal convictions.8 This writ must be brought in the
court of conviction.
A.

Habeas Corpus Through 1970

The original common law writ of habeas corpus was employed as early as A.D. 1200 to ensure the appearance of parties
before English courts. The writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum, the "Great Writ," was but one form of the original
writ and was used in cases of criminal confinement. Two pieces
of parliamentary legislation, the Act of 16419 and the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679,10 empowered common law courts to release
persons arbitrarily arrested by the King and Council. Courts
were empowered to review the legal sufficiency of the grounds
of imprisonment. Ironically, under the Act of 1679, court ordered confinements and criminal convictions, as opposed to executive ordered confinements, were exempt from review.
In this country, the Writ was memorialized in the Judiciary
Act of 1789 which granted federal courts the power to issue writs
of habeas corpus to prisoners "in custody under or by colour of
the authority of the United States."" Only nonjudicial detentions or confinement by the judgment of a12court without competence in the matter could be challenged.
The Writ was expanded in 1867 to allow federal courts to
hear habeas petitions from state prisoners. 13 Nevertheless, the
"jurisdiction" fiction persisted. A prisoner could be released
jurisdiction, and all state
only if the sentencing court lacked
4
remedies had been exhausted.'
Until 1942, the availability of habeas corpus relief against
federal or state convictions was limited to jurisdictional issues.
7. See notes 103-155 and accompanying text infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 271-289 infra.

9. 16 Car. I, c. 10, §§ III, VIII (1641).
10. 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (1679) (true warrant of commitment must be returned;
return must be made within specified time (§ II); writ to issue during vacations (§ MI); person released by habeas corpus for an unlawful confinement
cannot be recommitted for same offense (§ VI); prisoners not to be sent
beyond the seas (§ XII)).
11. 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (1789).
12. Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 201 (1830).
13. Act of Febriary 5, 1876, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, codified as 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c) (3) (1976).
14. Pepke v. Cronan, 155 U.S. 100 (1894); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241

(1896).
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In Waley v. Johnston,1 5 the Supreme Court decided that the
Writ was available to consider constitutional claims other than
questions of jurisdiction, at least in an attack on federal convictions. Finally in Brown v. Allen, 16 the Court decided that all
constitutional claims of petitioners attacking state convictions
could be heard by the federal courts regardless of the adequacy
of state procedures or the fact that the state court had fully and
7
fairly considered the claim.'
Prior to 1948, collateral attacks on convictions proceeded
under general statutory provisions somewhat comparable to 28
U.S.C. sections 2241-225318 and 28 U.S.C. section 1651. In 1948
the statutes were revised to modernize the general habeas
corpus provision 19 and to separate and clarify the remedy available to attack state convictions (section 2254) and federal convictions (section 2255). The impetus for the legislation was in
large part the requirement that a prisoner attacking a federal
conviction apply for habeas corpus in the district of confinement. This caused severe overburdening of the few districts
where federal institutions were located. Section 2255 now requires motions to be filed in the district of conviction.
In United States v. Hayman,20 the Supreme Court held that
section 2255 provided federal prisoners with a remedy
equivalent to habeas corpus. Nevertheless, lower courts balked
at the idea of hearing certain questions in section 2255 proceedings which would have been heard in habeas corpus proceedings. Kaufman v. United States,2 1 finally made it clear that all
constitutional claims could be raised in a section 2255 proceeding. The Court found no basis to conclude that federal prisoners had lesser rights under section 2255 than state prisoners
under section 2254. To ensure this, Congress built an escape
hatch into section 2255, providing that where the motion is inadequate or ineffective, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. section 2241 might be entertained.
Kaufman, along with three cases involving attacks on state
convictions for section 2254 petitioners, launched what critics
later described as a flood of habeas corpus petitions. The first of
15. 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
16. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
17. For an in depth discussion of the history of habeas corpus see Developments in the Lau-FederalHabeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1038 (1970).
That commentary, however, antedates the adoption of the Habeas Corpus
Rules.
18. Judiciary Act of 1789, as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 451-466 (1970).
19. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2253 (1976).
20. 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952).
21. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
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the state petitioner cases was Fay v. Noia.22 The Court held
the exhaustion requirement "refers only to a failure to exhaust
state remedies still open to the applicant at the time he files his
application for habeas corpus in the federal court. ''2 3 Fay also
held that res judicata was inapplicable in habeas proceedings,
thus allowing federal district courts to review federal constitutional claims regardless of any prior state court determination.
Next, Townsend v. Sain,24 compelled federal district courts to
conduct evidentiary hearings when any one of several condi25
tions was lacking.
[A] federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas
applicant under the following circumstances: If (1) the merits of
the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the
factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a
whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court
was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a
substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing;
or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact
did not
26
afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
The Townsend rule was later codified in the 1966 amendments
to section 2254. Finally, in Sanders v. United States,27 the Court
held that denial of a prior application for relief would not prevent reapplication unless "1) the same ground presented in the
subsequent application was determined adversely to the applicant on the prior application; 2) the prior determination was on
the merits, and 3) the ends of justice would not be served by
'28
reaching the merits of the subsequent application.
The Sanders ruling was later reaffirmed in Davis v. United
States.29 Here the petitioner was convicted for failure to report
for induction into the military service. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court in Gutknecht v. United States30 rescinded the regulation under which Davis was to be inducted.
The appellate court remanded, and the district court held
Gutknecht inapplicable. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. While the
petition for certiorari was pending, the Ninth Circuit reversed
an identical conviction in United States v. Fox.3 1 Davis's peti22. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).

23.
24.
25.
(1968).
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 399.
372 U.S. 293 (1963).
Townsend was held to be retroactive in Smith v. Yeager, 393 U.S. 122
372
373
373
417
396

U.S. at 313.
U.S. 1 (1963).
U.S. at 15.
U.S. 333 (1974).
U.S. 295 (1970).

31. 454 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1971).
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tion for certiorari was denied, and he sought section 2255 relief
on the basis of the change in the law. Relying on Sanders, the
Court held that the petitioner could relitigate the issue where
the law had changed despite an adverse decision in a prior section 2255 proceeding or on direct appeal.
B. Habeas Corpus and the Burger Court
The "flood" of habeas corpus petitions began to ebb with the
Burger Court's use of a "guilt-related" distinction. In
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,32 Mr. Justice Powell in a concurring
opinion, argued that since claims of unconstitutional searches
have no effect on the guilt or innocence of the criminal defendant, federal habeas relief is not warranted.
The Court adopted this rationale in Stone v. Powell,33 and
held that once a state "has provided an opportunity for full and
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim ... a state prisoner
may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief" on the basis of
use of illegally seized evidence.34 The Stone Court reasoned
that since the exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment is a
prophylactic device designed to deter police misconduct, "the
application of the rule [should be] restricted to those areas
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
Collateral review of fourth amendment violations
served."
36
would not effectively deter police misconduct.
Federal habeas corpus relief was further restricted in Francis v. Henderson.3 7 Petitioner Francis failed to object to the unconstitutional exclusion of blacks from the grand jury prior to
trial, as required by Louisiana law. The Court extended Davis
v. United States38 to section 2254 petitioners. Davis held that a
32. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
33. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). For an in depth discussion of Stone v. Powell,
see Robbins & Sanders, JudicialIntegrity, The Appearance of Justice, And
The Great Writ of Habeas Corpus: How to Kill Two Thirds (Or More) With
One Stone, 15 AM. CRnvf. L. REV. 63 (1977). See also Note, Stone v. Powell:
Scope of Habeas Corpus Revisited, 10 J. MAR.J. 401 (1977).

34. 428 U.S. at 494.

35. 428 U.S. at 486, citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974).

36. The danger inherent in the majority opinion was pointed out by Mr.
Justice Brennan. The "guilt-related" rationale easily could be expanded to
restrict relief for violations of double jeopardy, entrapment, self-incrimination, Miranda warnings and use of invalid identification procedures. 428
U.S. at 517-18. So far, this expansion has not materialized. See, e.g., White
v. Finkbeiner, 570 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Henne v.
Fike, 563 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1977) (declining to apply Stone v. Powell to fifth
amendment issues).

37. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
38. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).

34
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federal prisoner who failed timely to object to the composition of
the grand jury, was not entitled to relief under section 2255.
Several interests were advanced for the opinion, including the
possibility that a defendant could take his chances on an acquittal, and later raise the grand jury issue on appeal. Reprosecution would be difficult, and material witnesses and grand jurors
might then be unavailable. Finally, a finding that the grand jury
was unconstitutionally composed might affect other indictments
brought by the same grand jury.
In Estelle v. Williams,3 9 the Burger Court held that the petitioner's failure to object to standing trial in prison clothes "is
sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation."' 4 Where there was no practice in the state court that compelled criminal defendants to
stand trial in prison garb and where the petitioner had not objected at trial, the petitioner's silence precluded any hint of compulsion.
In dissent, Mr. Justice Brennan argued that since trial in
prison garb is a denial of due process, there must be a finding by
the court that waiver of the right was "knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently" made.4 ' Since the majority conceded that
trial in prison garb detracts from the presumption of innocence,
an objection would have been irrelevant to the purpose underlying the prohibition.42 The majority decision augurs danger for
state and federal petitioners. No longer does the Johnson v.
Zerbst43 standard of intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege control. The waiver in Estelle
v. Williams resulted from inaction alone.
The Supreme Court again limited habeas corpus jurisdiction in Wainwright v. Sykes, 44 by extending the ruling of Francis v. Henderson to the admission of allegedly involuntary
confessions at trial. Without timely objection, the Court held
review is "barred on habeas, as on direct appeal, absent a showing of cause for the noncompliance and some showing of actual
45
prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation.
The Court fails to define, however, the "cause" and "prejudice"
39. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
40. 425 U.S. at 513.
41. This standard was announced in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938).

42. 425 U.S. at 520.
43. See text accompanying
44. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). See
45. Id. at 84. This holding
timely objection. The Court
would extend the Stone ruling

note 41 supra.
notes 210-234 and accompanying text infra.

is limited to situations where there was no
specifically declined to decide whether it
to Miranda violations.
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exception, noting only that it is narrower than the Fay v. Noia
standard. "It is the sweeping language of Fay v. Noia, going far
46
beyond the facts of the case eliciting it, which we today reject.
Specifically, the Court discarded the dicta of Fay which had
suggested an "all-inclusive rule rendering state timely objection
rules ineffective to bar review of underlying federal claims...
absent a 'knowing waiver' or a 'deliberate bypass' of the right to
47
so object."
In short, the pendulum is swinging toward limiting the availability of habeas corpus relief. The tendency of the present
Supreme Court is to extend its restrictive holdings in Francisv.
Henderson, Stone v. Powell, Estelle v. Williams, and Wainwright v. Sykes,4 rather than limit them to their facts, and in
general, to contract federal jurisdiction wherever possible. This
inclination promises an uncertain future for habeas corpus petitioners.
II.

NATURE AND SCOPE OF REMEDY

A.

Relief Available

Historically, the Writ of Habeas Corpus was a civil proceeding to contest the legality of a prisoner's restraint or confinement in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States. 49 However, the writ is not a "static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose-the protection of individuals against erosion of their right
to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty. 5 0° No
longer is a claim for immediate release from custody the only
51
relief which may be sought.
Thus, in Carafasv. LaVallee,52 where the petitioner's sentence expired after he filed his petition, the Supreme Court held
that the case was not moot and the federal court released him
from the consequences of his conviction: inability to engage in
certain businesses, to serve as an official of a labor union, to vote
in state elections, and to serve as a juror. Also, the remedies
contemplated include: release from prison disciplinary confine46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 87-88.
Id. at 85.
See text accompanying notes 3247 supra.
Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335 (1968).
Janes v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).

51. Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391
U.S. 234 (1968) and Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), overrulingMcNally v.

Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934) (to the extent that immediate release from custody
was a requirement for a petition).
52. 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
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ment to the status of an ordinary prisoner, 5 3 restoration of goodtime credits resulting in a shortening of the length of actual confinement, 54 invalidation of a prior conviction making petitioner
ineligible for probation on a subsequent conviction,5 5 stay of deportation pending appeal of administrative actions,5 6 testing the
validity of induction or enlistment into military service, 57 or to
test the validity of an alien's exclusion from the United States.5 8
B.

Claims Reviewable by Writ of Habeas Corpus-Sections
2241 and 2254
The list of claims reviewable by the federal courts on habeas

corpus petitions is inexhaustible.

Any person in custody,

whether present or future,5 9 pursuant to a state court judgment
that violates the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States, may petition the federal district court for a writ of
habeas corpus. 60 Only recently has the Supreme Court begun
61
to restrict the remedy after a long period of expansion.
The most common grounds for section 2254 petitions are
enumerated in the Model Form for use in Applications for
Habeas Corpus. 62 Some representative issues under sections
2241 and 2254 are: denial of the right to counsel; 63 ineffective
assistance of counsel;64 illegal execution of sentence; 65 invalidity
53. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Hudson v. Hardy, 424 F.2d 854
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
54. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
55. Arketa v. Wilson, 373 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1967).
56. Pierre v. United States, 525 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1976).
57. Grazier v. Hackel, 440 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1971); Hammond v. Lenfest,
398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968); Exparte Fabiani, 105 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
58. Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956).
59. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54
(1968) (future custody). When the petitioner is no longer in custody, see 28
U.S.C. § 1651 (1976), and text accompanying notes 271-289 infra.
60. Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Court,
Rule 1. Persons in custody pursuant to a judgment of a federal court may
challenge that conviction via 28 U.S.C. § 2255. If this remedy is inadequate
or ineffective, federal prisoners may apply for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, the general habeas corpus statute.
61. See text accompanying notes 32-48 supra.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976) at 276-77.
63. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977) on remand, 577 F.2d 411 (7th Cir.
1978); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473
(1972); Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962); White v. Finkbeiner,
570 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1978) (denial resulted in coerced confession); Davis v.
Estelle, 529 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1976); Daniels v. Alabama, 487 F.2d 887 (5th
Cir. 1973) (not informed of right to counsel on appeal, or of right to appeal);
Lumpkin v. Smith, 439 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1971); Braun v. Rhay, 416 F.2d 1055
(9th Cir. 1969).
64. White v. Estelle, 566 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1978); Morrow v. Parratt, 574
F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1978); Bonds v. Wainwright, 564 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 1977),
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of proceedings or statute;66 defects in verdict, sentence, or commitment;67 former jeopardy; 68 prosecutor's comments on dereh. en bancgranted Feb. 13, 1978; Rinehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126 (8th Cir.
1977); United States ex rel. Healey v. Cannon, 553 F.2d 1052 (7th Cir. 1977);
Mason v. Balcom, 531 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Williams
v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1976);

Garza v. Wolff, 528 F.2d 208 (8th Cir. 1975); Riser v. Craven, 501 F.2d 381 (9th
Cir. 1974)- Sawicki v. Johnson, 475 F.2d 183 (6th Cir. 1973); Newberry v.
Wingo, 446 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1971); Nelson v. Peyton, 415 F.2d 1154 (4th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, sub nom. Cox v. Nelson, 397 U.S. 1007 (1970). But see
Alvarez v. Wainwright, 522 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1975) (split in Fifth Circuit as
to state action requirement).
65. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404
U.S. 249 (1971); United States ex rel. Ferris v. Finkbeiner, 551 F.2d 185 (7th
Cir. 1977) (failure to inform defendant of mandatory 5-year parole term);
Ron v. Wilkinson, 565 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir. 1977) (writ is available to attack
penalties in prison disciplinary hearings); Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625 (7th
Cir. 1977); Ross v. Mebane, 536 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1976) (federal prisoner

deprived of good time credit); United States v. DiRusso, 535 F.2d 673 (1st
Cir. 1976) (federal sentencing court could only correct mistake in effect of
sentence through § 2241, not § 2255); Davis v. Willingham, 415 F.2d 344 (10th

Cir. 1969) (presentence credit). Challenges to prison conditions are better
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for several practical reasons: there is no exhaustion requirement, or "in custody" requirement, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are applicable including broader discovery, fees and costs are
recoverable under the Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, and there is a
greater chance of surviving a motion to dismiss. Accord, Advisory Committee. But see Secret v. Brierton, 584 F.2d 823 (1978) (prisoners must exhaust
adequate administrative remedies).
66. Balthzar v. Superior Court of Mass., 573 F.2d 698 (3d Cir. 1978) (statute unconstitutionally vague); Allen v. County Court, Ulster City, 568 F.2d
998 (2d Cir. 1977); Royal v. Superior Court of N.H., 531 F.2d 1084 (1st Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 869 (1977) (flag desecration statute unconstitutionally vague); Vuitch v. Hardy, 473 F.2d 1370 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 824 (1974) (abortion statute unconstitutional).
67. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711 (1969) (second sentence exceeded first); Peyton v. Rowe, 391
U.S. 54 (1968) (§ 2241 is available to attack constitutionality of consecutive
sentence); Strader v. Troy, 571 F.2d 1263 (4th Cir. 1978) (invalid prior convictions may not be considered in sentencing defendant); Goins v. Brierly, 464
F.2d 947 (3d Cir. 1972) (district court could review validity of 1947 convictions). But see Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (threat of reindictment on more serious charge if defendant does not plead guilty does
not violate due process).
68. Greene v. Massey, -U.S. -, 98 S.Ct. 2151 (1978) (defendant may not
be retried where appellate court reversed conviction for insufficient evidence); Crist v. Bretz, - U.S. -, 98 S.Ct. 2156 (1978) (jeopardy attaches in
jury trial when jury is empaneled and sworn, and Montana statute providing that jeopardy attached when first witness was sworn could not be constitutionally applied to jury trial); Sumpter v. DeGroote, 552 F.2d 1206 (7th
Cir. 1977) (failure to prove essential element of crime); Alvarez v. Estelle,
531 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1044 (1977) (claim properly before federal court though not raised at state trial); Mizell v. Attorney
General, 442 F. Supp. 868 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Grizzle v. Turner, 387 F. Supp. 1
(W.D. Okla. 1975) But see Arizona v. Washington, 98 S.Ct. 824 (1978) (manifest necessity for mistrial precludes double jeopardy bar).
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70
fendant's failure to testify;69 standing trial in prison garb;
prosecutor's use of perjured testimony;71 failure to produce exculpatory material under Brady;72 right to bail; 73 parole and pro75 trial court errors;76
bation decisions; 74 invalid guilty plea;

69. Houston v. Estelle, 569 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1978) (other inflammatory
and prejudicial remarks); Berryman v. Colbert, 538 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1976).
70. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (failure to object to standing
trial in prison garb); Gaito v. Brierly, 485 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1973).
71. Annunziato v. Manson, 566 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1977). United States ex
rel. Wilson v. Warden, 538 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel.

Washington v. Vincent, 525 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, sub nom.
Bombard v. Washington, 424 U.S. 934 (1976) (petition granted even though
defendant had reason to know perjury and did not inform the court); Burks
v. Egeler, 512 F.2d 221 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1976) (must
be knowing and deliberate use).
72. Austin v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1976). See also United States
ex rel. Washington v. Vincent, 525 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, sub
nom. Bombard v. Washington, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). But see United States ex
rel. Moore v. Brierton, 560 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1977).
73. United States ex rel. Barbour v. District Dir. of I. &N.S., 491 F.2d 573
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974) ("bad bail risk" improper basis
to deny bail to alien); Abbott v. Laurie, 422 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1976) and
United States ex rel. Rainwater v. Morris, 411 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1976)
(arbitrary denial of bail authorized by state statute); Bobick v. Schaeffer,
366 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (court will inquire whether state court's
action is arbitrary, discriminatory, or results in denial of counsel or fair
trial); United States ex rel. Kane v. Bensinger, 359 F. Supp. 181 (N.D. Ill.
1972), affd, 484 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1973) (failure of state court to give reason

for denial of bail pending appeal).

74. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (unlawful parole revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation); United
States ex rel. Sims v. Sielaff, 563 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1977) (Barker v. Wingo
standards applied to delay in revocation hearing); Cox v. Benson, 548 F.2d
186 (7th Cir. 1977) (false, insufficient, capricious or no reasons given for denial of parole); Lee v. United States, 501 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1974) (§2241 is
proper avenue for federal prisoner to challenge parole board actions). See
text accompanying notes 239-246 infra. A cautionary word is due regarding
parole revocation and parole violator warrants. Federal parolees are not entitled to prompt parole revocation hearings when a warrant is lodged with
the institution but not served on parolee. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78
(1976). Moody is applicable to detainers placed against state as well as federal prisoners. Head v. United States Bd. of Parole, 553 F.2d 22 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 959 (1977). See also United States ex. rel. Caruso v.
United States Bd. of Parole, 570 F.2d 1150 (3d Cir. 1978).
75. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977) (unkept plea agreement);
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976) (element of intent not explained);
Rinehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1977) (no understanding of nature
of crime); United States ex rel. Healey v. Cannon, 553 F.2d 1052 (7th Cir.
1977) (misinformation by counsel).
76. Woodcock v. McCauley, 563 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1977) (court would
only allow continuance if defendant waived jury trial); Welcome v. Vincent,
549 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, sub nom. Fogg v. Welcome, 432 U.S.
911 (1977) (trial court refused to permit examination of witness concerning
witness's prior confession to crime); Davis v. Alabama, 545 F.2d 460 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 957 (1977) (refusal to grant continuance); Shirley
v. North Carolina, 528 F.2d 819 (4th Cir. 1975) (denial of continuance to procure testimony of indispensable witness); Painter v. Looke, 485 F.2d 427 (4th
Cir. 1973) (refusal to allow defense counsel to make pretrial motions); Favre
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denial of right to confront witnesses; 77 incompetence to stand
trial;7 8 challenges to jury selection procedures; 7 9 due process violations;80 denial of right to speedy trial;8 1 unconstitutionally
suggestive pre-trial identifications; 82 intervening change of
law; 83 improper prison conditions;8 4 improper jury instructions; 85 excessive pre-trial publicity;86 failure to give free tranv. Henderson, 464 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 942 (1973)

(denial of right to cross-examine informants).
77. Burkhart v. Lane, 574 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1978) (admission of nontestifying codefendant's confession at trial in violation of Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)). Favre v. Henderson, 464 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 942 (1973) (denial of right to cross-examine informants); United States ex rel. Jones v. Morris, 430 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Ill.
1977) (cross-examination of eyewitness not allowed).
78. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Suggs v. LaVallee, 570 F.2d 1092
(2d Cir. 1978); Tillery v. Eyman, 492 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1974); Bruce v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
79. Mitchell v. Rose, 570 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1978); Bradley v. Judges of
Superior Court, 531 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1976) (petitioners must show
prejudice from jury selection methods).
80. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) ("totality of circumstances"
test to be used to determine whether pretrial identification evidence and
testimony violated due process); Blackedge v. Perry, 421 U.S. 21 (1974) (subsequent felony indictment after petitioner appealed misdemeanor conviction violated due process); Lockett v. Blackburn, 571 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1978)
(state's deliberate concealment of two eyewitnesses violated due process);
United States ex rel. Morgan v. Sielaff, 546 F.2d 218 (7th Cir. 1976) (lesser
standard of proof for sentencing under Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons
Act denied due process). But see Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357
(1978) (threat of reindictment on more serious charge if defendant does not

plead guilty does not violate due process).

81. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973); Kane v.
Virginia, 419 F.2d 1369 (4th Cir. 1970) (state must make diligent effort to try
defendant after lodging detainer); Morrison v. Jones, 428 F. Supp. 82
(W.D.N.C. 1977) (state waited 3 years to retry petitioner following mistrial).
See also Smith v. Mabry, 564 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1977) (Barker v. Wingo factors apply to determine denial of right). But see Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d
1280 (5th Cir. 1976).
82. Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Swicegood v. Alabama, 577
F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1978) (unduly suggestive lineup); Jones v. Wisconsin, 562
F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1977).
83. Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. 59 (1974) (no need to resubmit cause

to state court which declined review where statute was subsequently declared unconstitutional). But see Bonner v. Wyrick, 563 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir.
1977) (Missouri statute struck down).
84. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (challenges to fact or duration of confinement cognizable by habeas corpus petition, conditions of confinement may also be challenged by civil rights action); Wilwording v.
Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (challenge to living conditions and disciplinary
measures). See also note 65 supra.

85. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973) (erroneous instruction must
so infect entire trial that resulting conviction violates due process). Dunn v.
Perrin, 570 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1978);Reid v. Riddle, 550 F.2d 1003 (4th 6ir. 1977)
(refusal to give curative instruction following improper closing argument).
But see Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977) (failure to object to instruction results in little hope for success); Frazier v. Weatherholtz, 572 F.2d 994
(4th Cir. 1978) (failure to object as required by Virginia rules). See also

40

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 12:1

script to indigent defendant; 8 7 use of defendant's silence as
impeachment;88 failure to inform or misinforming defendant
about sentence; 89 and bailiff's testimony as to substance of attorney-client conversation. °
The following issues are no longer reviewable via habeas
corpus petition: search and seizure questions where the state
has conducted a full and fair hearing;91 failure to object to voluntariness of confession; 92 failure to object to standing trial in
94
prison garb;93 denial of right to allocution before sentencing;
technical defects in indictment;95 sufficiency of evidence; 96 prejTaylor v. Kentucky, 98 S. Ct. 1930 (1978) (failure to give presumption of innocence instruction violated right to fair trial).
86. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
87. United States ex rel. Cleveland v. Warden, 544 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir.
1976) (failure aborted opportunity to appeal).
88. Douglas v. Cupp, 578 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1978); Morgan v. Hall, 569 F.2d
1161 (1st Cir. 1977); Jones v. Wyrick, 542 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977).
89. United States ex rel. Baker v. Finkbeiner, 551 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1977)
(failure to inform petitioner of 2-year mandatory parole term); United
States ex rel. Ferris v. Finkbeiner, 551 F. 2d 185 (7th Cir. 1977) (petitioner
misinformed by court as to parole term); Rinehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126
(8th Cir. 1977) (failure to inform as to maximum sentence).
90. Poulin v. Gunn, 548 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1977).
91. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830
(2d Cir. 1977) (federal habeas court refused to hear objection to fourth
amendment violations which were not raised until state coram nobis proceeding); Moore v. Cowan, 560 F.2d 1298 (6th Cir. 1977) (federal habeas
court refused to hear claim where state appellate court found error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt without addressing merits of claim);
O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1977) (where facts were undisputed, evidentiary hearing not required, full and fair hearing requirement satisfied when state appellate court fully considered claim); Tisnado
v. United States, 547 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1976) (claim rejected by state
Supreme Court, fairness of proceedings not challenged); United States ex
rel. Saiken v. Bensinger, 546 F.2d 1292, (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
930 (1977) (Stone applied where writ was granted, subsequently vacated,
and granted again); United States ex rel. Placek v. Illinois, 546 F.2d 1298
(7th Cir. 1976); Bracco v. Reed, 540 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1976) (Stone enunciated no new formulation of exclusionary rule; Stone applicable to case on
appeal from district court when decision was rendered); Chavez v. Rodriguez, 540 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1976) (Stone decision applied to case on appeal
from district court when decision was rendered); Poindexter v. Wolff, 540
F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1976). But see Petillo v. New Jersey, 418 F. Supp. 686 (D.
N.J. 1976) (where petitioners were not allowed to assert claim that warrant
was procured by police perjury, federal habeas court would issue writs).
92. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (rule of Francis v. Henderson
extended to failure to object to admission of confession; defendant must
show cause for noncompliance with procedural rule and actual prejudice).
But see Ferguson v. Boyd, 566 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1977).
93. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
94. Lunz v. Henderson, 533 F.2d 1322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom.
Lunz v. Smith, 429 U.S. 849 (1976).
95. Blake v. Morford, 563 F.2d 248 (6th Cir. 1977); Burrows v. Engle, 545
F.2d 552 (6th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. O'Neill v. Burke, 379 F.2d 656
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udicial remarks by prosecutor; 97 length of state sentence; 98 admission of evidence at trial;99 entrapment; 0 0 and limited
exclusion of the public from trial.' 0 '
With the decision in Wainwright v. Sykes, 0 2 the Court appears to be moving toward a "New Federalism." Whatever the
motivation, the appearance of comity and harmony in federalPrior to
state relations is enjoying peak popularity.
Wainwright, it was, at best, unclear how far Stone v. Powell,
Francis v. Henderson, and Estelle v. Williams would be extended. At this time, however, the practical view is that habeas
petitioners should expect the worst.
C. Claims Reviewable on Section 2255 Motion
The most common grounds for a section 2255 motion are
enumerated in the model form. 10 3 The following are claims
often raised: lack of jurisdiction; 1° 4 invalidity of proceedings or
statute; 10 5 failure of the indictment to charge an offense; 10 6 de(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 876 (1967). But see Watson v. Jago, 558 F.2d
330 (6th Cir. 1977) (constructive amendment impermissible).
96. Spratlin v. Solem, 577 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1978) (conviction must be totally devoid of evidentiary support); Talavera v. Wainwright, 547 F.2d 1238
(5th Cir. 1977); Jackson v. Alabama, 534 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1976); White v.
Wyrick, 530 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1976) (petition must be denied if any credible
evidence appears in state trial); Fish v. Cardwell, 523 F.2d 976 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1062 (1976).
97. Maggit v. Wyrick, 533 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 898
(1976); Marlin v. Florida, 489 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1974); Bergenthal v. Cady, 466
F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973).
98. Willeford v. Estelle, 538 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir. 1976). But see Strader v.
Troy, 571 F.2d 1263 (4th Cir. 1978) (considering invalid prior convictions in
sentencing defendant requires resentencing or release).
99. United States ex rel. Clark v. Fike, 538 F.2d 750, 758 (7th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1064 (1977) (error must be of such magnitude to deny
fundamental fairness).
100. Ainsworth v. Reed, 542 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
917 (1977) (rule is not a constitutional doctrine, but court created limitation
on governmental activity).
101. United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1977)
(public excluded during testimony of rape victim; court should balance
harm to witness and prejudice to defendant); United States ex rel. Lloyd v.
Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975) (public excluded during undercover agent's testimony).
102. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976) at 288-89.
104. See Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 178 (1947); United States v. Allocco,
305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 964 (1963); United States v.
Rider, 282 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1960).
105. Strauss v. United States, 516 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1975) (checkkiting
scheme not criminal under Supreme Court ruling). See generally Sunal v.
Large, 332 U.S. 174, 178 (1947). But see note 155 infra.
106. Hilderbrand v. United States, 261 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1958).
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nial of right to speedy trial; 10 7 fourth amendment violations; 10 8
involuntary or invalid guilty plea; 10 9 failure of the trial court to
determine the factual basis for a guilty plea;" 0 incompetency to
stand trial;"' language barrier preventing understanding of
right to trial by jury;112 denial of effective assistance of counsel; 113 consecutive sentences for same transaction; 114 or concurrent sentences; 115 nondisclosure of Brady material; 116 knowing
107. Waugaman v. United States, 331 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1964). Contra,
United States v. Shields, 291 F.2d 798 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 933
(1961).
108. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969); Duhart v. United
States, 476 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 421 U.S. 1006 (1975). But
see Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1976) (Stone v. Powell

precluded federal court from reexamining validity of prior state conviction
on fourth amendment grounds in § 2255 proceeding); Green v. United
States, 460 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1972) (illegal arrest, but no property seized).
109. Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213 (1973); Machibroda v. United
States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962); United States ex. rel. Robinson v. Israel, 581 F.2d
1276 (7th Cir. 1978); Coody v. United States, 570 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1978)
(compliance with Rule 11 necessary); Wilson v. United States, 554 F.2d 893
(8th Cir. 1977); Rose v. United States, 513 F.2d 1251 (8th Cir. 1975); Bannister
v. United States, 446 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1971). See generally United States v.
Sams, 521 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1975). But see Micklus v. United States, 537 F.2d
381 (9th Cir. 1976) (mistake by counsel overstating maximum penalty did
not invalidate plea).
110. Herron v. United States, 512 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1975); Gilbert v. United
States, 466 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1972); Schworak v. United States, 419 F.2d 1313
(2d Cir. 1970). But see Arias v. United States, 484 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 418 U.S. 905 (1974).
111. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); United States v. Hollis,

569 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1977) (burden of proof as to incompetency); Rose v.
United States, 513 F.2d 1251 (8th Cir. 1975); Bryant v. United States, 468 F.2d
812 (8th Cir. 1972). See also Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956)

(question of competency inadequately resolved); Taylor v. United States,
282 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1960) (incompetent defendant cannot be expected to
raise claim before trial).
112. United States v. Reyes-Meza de Polanco, 422 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1081 (1970); Atilus v. United States, 378 F.2d 52

(5th Cir. 1967).

113. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Sincox v. United States,

571 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1978) (failure of counsel to object to nonunanimous

verdict and failure to appeal); Summers v. United States, 538 F.2d 1208 (5th
Cir. 1976); Kent v. United States, 423 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1970) (failure of
counsel to timely appeal resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel). But
see cases cited in note 153 infra.
114. United States v. Southerland, 565 F.2d 1281 (4th Cir. 1977); Natarelli
v. United States, 516 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Barnett, 407
F.2d 1114 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 907 (1969); Mathis v. United States,
200 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1952); Neeley v. United States, 405 F. Supp. 1186 (W.D.
Va. 1975).
115. Gentry v. United States, 533 F.2d 998 (6th Cir. 1976).
116. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Dansker, 565
F.2d 1262 (3d Cir. 1977) (summary dismissal of claim improper). But see
United States v. Smith, 538 F.2d 1332 (8th Cir. 1976) (where evidence with-

held was for impeachment only and wealth of impeachment evidence was
presented at trial, vacation of conviction not required); Hampton v. United

19781

CollateralAttacks on Convictions

use of perjured testimony;11 7 misinformation in presentence investigation; 1 8 failure to find defendant would not benefit from
Youth Corrections Act;1 19 denial of defendant's right to be present at certain proceedings; 120 trial court's mistake as to sentence;' 2 1 violations relating to probation conditions or
123
revocation; 22 failure to inform or misinforming as to parole;
failure to produce statements under the Jencks Act;124 jury in25
struction which had the effect of amending the indictment;
denial of right to appeal; 26 invalid prior convictions used to enStates, 504 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 917 (1975) (where
defendant knew of material but failed to make request, claim is waived).
117. Crismon v. United States, 510 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1975).
118. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972); Townsend v. Burke, 334
U.S. 736 (1948); Moore v. United States, 571 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1978); Avery v.
United States, 494 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Powell, 487 F.2d
325 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Buckley, 379 F.2d 424 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 929 (1967). See also United States v. Dinapoli, 519 F.2d 104
(6th Cir. 1975) (failure to obtain presentence report for first offenders is
grounds to vacate conviction).
119. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974); But see Bustillo v.
United States, 573 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1978) (explicit findings not required);
DeVerse v. United States, 536 F.2d 804 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 897
(1976).
120. United States v. Behrens, 375 U.S. 162 (1963) (sentencing); Williams
v. United States, 521 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1975) (impanelling of jury); United
States v. Jasper, 481 F.2d 976 3d Cir. 1973) (resentencing). But see Phillips
v. United States, 533 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (197)
(does not extend to presence at § 2255 hearing).
121. Addonizo v. United States, 573 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1978) (change in parole guidelines); Kortness v. United States, 514 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1975)
(change in parole guidelines); Russell v. United States, 507 F.2d 1029 (4th
Cir. 1974) (mistake as to maximum penalty); Hightower v. United States,
455 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1972) (misunderstanding by judge as to state sentence). But see Musto v. United States, 571 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1978) (court
exceeded jurisdiction in altering sentence where judge misapprehended effect of parole guidelines in particular case).
122. United States v. Webster, 492 F.2d 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (revocation);
Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971) (probation conditions violated
first amendment rights).
123. United States ex. rel. Robinson v. Israel, 581 F.2d 1276 (7th Cir. 1978);
Timmreck v. United States, 577 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1978) (court failed to advise defendant of 3-year special parole term); Yothers v. United States, 572
F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1978); Brown v. United States, 565 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1977);
United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1976) (failure to inform of 6year mandatory special parole term); .Gates v. United States, 515 F.2d 73
(7th Cir. 1975) (misinformed regarding parole eligibility).
124. Krilich v. United States, 502 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 992 (1975) (where purpose of statute was to effectuate constitutional
right noncompliance may be reviewed on § 2255 motion). Contra,Wilson v.
United States, 554 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Angelet, 255 F.2d
383 (2d Cir. 1958).
125. Howard v. Daggett, 526 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1975). But see note 137
infra.
126. United States v. Duhart, 511 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed,
421 U.S. 1006 (1975); Kirk v. United States, 447 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1971) (eveh
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hance punishment for a subsequent crime; 1 27 breach of plea bargain agreements; 128 newly discovered evidence (after two-year
limitation in F.R. Crim. P. Rule 33);129 and substantial disparity
130
in sentencing for defendant who exercised right to stand trial.
The following are not cognizable on a section 2255 motion:
illegal arrest alone; 13 1 untimely challenges to grand jury composition; 3 2 sufficiency of or defects in indictment or information; 13 3 improper venue or removal; 13 4 sufficiency or
admissibility of evidence; 1 ordinary trial errors; 136 jury instruc138
tions; 3 7 waiver of nonjurisdictional defenses by guilty plea;
though retained counsel had filed notice of appeal, appeal was never perfected).
127. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (right to counsel previously violated); O'Shea v. United States, 491 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1974); Dameron v. United States, 488 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1974).
128. Richardson v. United States, 577 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1978) (noncompliance with formal requirements of rule of criminal procedure is cognizable
in § 2255 proceeding only if defendant is prejudiced); Brown v. United
States, 565 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1977); Vandenades v. United States, 523 F.2d
1220 (5th Cir. 1975); Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973). But see Bryan v. United States, 492 F.2d 775
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974).
129. Anderson v. United States, 443 F.2d 1226 (10th Cir. 1971) (confession
by another to crime).
130. United States v. Capriola, 537 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1976) (record silent
as to sentencing court's reasons for more severe sentence).
131. Green v. United States, 460 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1972); Runge v. United
States, 427 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1970); Cox v. United States, 351 F.2d 280 (8th
Cir. 1965); Moreland v. United States, 347 F.2d 376 (10th Cir. 1965).
132. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
133. Campbell v. United States, 538 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1976) (failure to object before trial); Entrekin v. United States, 508 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 977 (1975); Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282 (7th
Cir. 1972) (unless exceptional circumstances exist).
134. Entrekin v. United States, 508 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.denied,
421 U.S. 977 (1975); Runge v. United States, 427 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1970);
Marcella v. United States, 344 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1016 (1966) (untimely objection).
135. Crismon v. United States, 510 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1975) (admissibility
of evidence); Whitney v. United States, 513 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1974) (sufficiency of evidence); Cauley v. United States, 294 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1961)
(weight of evidence).
136. Middlebrooks v. United States, 500 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1974).
137. Egger v. United States, 509 F.2d 745 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
842 (1975); DiPiazza v. United States, 471 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1973); Lorraine v.
United States, 444 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1971) (unless so fundamentally unfair to
deny due process); Hall v. United States, 410 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 970 (1969); Feeney v. United States, 392 F.2d 541 (1st Cir.
1968). But see note 125 supra.
138. Grier v. United States, 472 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1973) (privilege against
self-incrimination); Eaton v. United States, 458 F.2d 704 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972) (entrapment defense); McDonald v. United
States, 437 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1971) (incompetence at time statement was
signed); Runge v. United States, 427 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1970) (illegal detention before arraignment); Rice v. United States, 420 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1969),
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entrapment; 139 denial of right to allocution at sentencing; 14 ° failure to grant continuance; 141 issues already decided on direct appeal (Eighth Circuit only); 142 expiration of the statute of
limitations; 14 3 absence of judge during voir dire;144 prejudicial
joinder; 45 denial of request to subpoena witnesses; 46 prejudicial pre-trial publicity; 147 denial of public trial; 48 insanity at
time of offense; 149 improper use of informers; 150 alleged prejudicial statement by judge or prosecutor;' 51 improper statements
by bailiff to jury; 152 ineffective assistance of counsel not resulting in deprivation of constitutional rights; 153 mistake of counsel
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 910 (1970) (holding defendant without bail, failure to
show defendant indictment before arraignment, failure to take defendant
before magistrate)i Austin v. United States, 408 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1969) (failure to have preliminary hearing); United States v. French, 274 F.2d 297 (7th
Cir. 1960) (delay in bringing defendant before magistrate).
139. Eaton v. United States, 458 F.2d 704 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
880 (1972); Evans v. United States, 408 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1969); Black v.
United States, 269 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1959).
140. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962). But see Green v. United
States, 313 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.), cert. dismissed, 372 U.S. 951 (1963) ("other aggravating circumstances" present).
141. Houser v. United States, 508 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1974); Weinreich v.
United States, 414 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 996 (1970).
142. Whitney v. United States, 513 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1974); Houser v.
United States, 508 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1974); Cardarella v. United States, 351
F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1020 (1966) (§ 2255 is not a
substitute remedy for appeal).
143. See generally United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977); Askins v. United States, 251 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir.
1958) (if statute of limitations applies to indictment, defense must be raised
at or before trial).
144. Stirone v. United States, 341 F.2d 253 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
902 (1965).
145. Cardarella v. United States, 351 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 1020 (1966) (no objection below); Neeley v. United States, 405 F.
Supp. 1186 (W.D. Va. 1975) (no objection below).
146. United States v. Shields, 291 F.2d 798 (6th Cir. 1961); Olsen v. United
States, 390 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Minn 1975), appeal dismissed, 521 F.2d 1404
(8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1075 (1976).
147. Wingo v. United States, 244 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1957) (claim not raised
below).
148. Geise v. United States, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 842 (1959).
149. Rice v. United States, 420 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 910 (1970); Bradley v. United States, 347 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1016 (1966).
150. Ruiz v. United States, 328 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1964).
151. Vandergrift v. United States, 313 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1963); Holt v.
United States, 303 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 970 (1963);
Smith v. United States, 265 F.2d 14 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 910
(1959) (claim not raised on appeal).
152. Zachary v. United States, 275 F.2d 793 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 816 (1960) (failure to raise on appeal).
153. Johnson v. United States, 506 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 978 (1975) (reaffirming Cardarella v. United States); United States
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155
as to sentence;1M and change in law.

III.

SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF

A. In Custody Requirement-Sections 2241, 2254, and 2255
Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases states the
initial ground rule for entertainment of a petition for writ of
habeas corpus-a person must be in custody pursuant to a state
court judgment15 6 to determine whether such custody violates
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States; or a person must be in custody pursuant to either a state or federal
court judgment but challenging future custody under a state
court judgment, to determine whether such future custody violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
1 57
This requirement applies to Section 2255 motions.
It is of little significance how custody occurred-whether by
executive order, court order, private party or other reason 15 8-so
long as physical liberty is restrained. Nor is it necessary that
the restraint be actual physical confinement. In Jones v.
Cunningham,159 the Supreme Court held that a prisoner, on parole is sufficiently deprived of freedom as to be "in custody" for
federal habeas purposes. 6 0 The Court extended Jones to an individual released on a personal recognizance bond in Hensley v.
v. Haywood, 464 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (reaffirming Bruce v. United
States, 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967)). But see note 113 supra.
154. Micklus v. United States, 537 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1976) (mistake as to
maximum would not invalidate plea); Ellis v. United States, 353 F.2d 402

(8th Cir. 1965) (error as to eligibility for parole had no bearing on sentence).

155. Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947); Heinecke v. United States, 316
F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 846 (1963); United States v. Sobell,
314 F.2d 314 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 857 (1963). But see Davis v.
United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974); Sosa v. United States, 550 F.2d 244 (5th
Cir. 1977); Strauss v. United States, 516 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1975) (proof of mail

fraud changed by Supreme Court ruling); United States v. Liguori, 438 F.2d

663 (2d Cir. 1971) (invalid statutory presumption of knowledge of illegal importation from possession disallowed).

156. Cf. Jackson v. Justices of Superior Court, 423 F. Supp. 50 (D. Mass.
1976), rev'd on other grounds, 549 F.2d 215 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
975 (1977) (judgment of conviction not necessary where claim is that trial
will violate double jeopardy).
157. Habeas Corpus Rule 1 (§2255).
158. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (unlawful parole revocation); Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972) (unlawful detention by executive or military); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948) (invalid guilty
plea); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (denial of constitutional rights
at trial); In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894) (unlawful detention in wrong institution); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886) (imprisonment under defective indictment); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880) (petitioner convicted

under unconstitutional statute).

159. 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
160. But see Huante v. Craven, 500 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1974) (federal pris-
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Municipal Court.161 Where the petitioner was subject to restraints "not shared by the public generally," the requirements
162
of "in custody" were met for federal habeas purposes.
In other situations, the Court has taken a flexible, practical
approach to the "in custody" requirement. In Peyton v.
Rowe, 163 the Court held that habeas corpus was proper to attack
a future consecutive sentence. 164 In the same term, the Court
upheld a habeas attack on a conviction where the petitioner had
been unconditionally released from custody, but the petition
had been filed prior to his release. 165
The Advisory Committee Note to Habeas Corpus Rule 1
(section 2254) lists the following additional situations as examples of "in custody": probation, 166 conditionally suspended sentence, 167 bail, 168 federal stay of state sentence, 169 parole detainer
oner who was paroled to immigration authorities for deportation not "in
custody").
161. 411 U.S. 345 (1976).
162. The Court emphasized, of course, that this holding would not apply
to a state defendant released on bail or his own recognizance pending trial
or appeal because of the exhaustion doctrine. See also Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 286 n.2 (1975) (Hensley applied to prisoner released on
bail pending final disposition of his case in federal court).
163. 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
164. In the same year the Court also disposed of the idea that in order to
petition for habeas relief, a prisoner must be entitled to immediate release.
In the converse situation of Peyton v. Rowe, note 163 supra,the Court held
that a state prisoner could attack a life sentence currently being served in
spite of the pendency of a consecutive sentence of 5 years of assault.
Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335 (1968). See also Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973) (habeas corpus is appropriate to seek shortening of actual confinement by restoring good time credit).
165. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968). When a petitioner has completed a sentence and is unconditionally released, there is technically no
custody, but collateral legal consequences nevertheless may be suffered, including inability to hold certain offices, jobs, or to sit on a jury. It is clear
that if suit is instituted before release, the court retains jurisdiction. But
may it be instituted after release when there is no case or controversy?
The answer would appear to be "yes" under Carafas v. LaVallee, supra, so
long as collateral consequences exist. See also Scarborough v. Kellum, 525
F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1976); Glover v. North Carolina, 301 F. Supp. 364 (E.D.N.C.
1969). But see Harvey v. South Dakota, 526 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976) (collateral consequences in Carafas only kept
case from becoming moot, but could not give the court habeas jurisdiction);
Carter v. Hardy, 526 F.2d 314 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838 (1976) (writ
not available when conviction is not used for enhancement purposes).
166. United States v. Re, 372 F.2d 641 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 912
(1967).
167. Walker v. North Carolina, 262 F. Supp. 102 (W.D.N.C. 1966), affd per
curiam, 372 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 917 (1967).
168. Burris v. Ryan, 397 F.2d 553 (7th Cir. 1968).
169. Choung v. California, 320 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
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warrant, 170 appeal bond, 17 1 and sentence served but convicted
172
State detainer warfelon precluded from certain activities.
173
rants also satisfy the "in custody" requirement.
Unfortunately for the practitioner, courts are divided on
what constitutes "in custody" where less than physical restraint
is involved. As the Advisory Committee noted, "[t] here is as of
now, no final list of the situations which are appropriate for
habeas corpus relief. It is not the intent of these rules or notes
75
the
to define or limit custody."'174 Citing Morgan v. Thomas,
Committee agreed that "something more than moral restraint is
necessary." Moreover, "there are other restraints on a man's

liberty, restraint not shared by the public generally which have
been thought sufficient ... to support the issuance of habeas
176

corpus."'

The following circumstances have been held insufficient to
177
satisfy the "in custody" requirement: imposition of8 fine only,
17
and petition for expungement of prior conviction.
B.

Exhaustion of State Remedies-Sections 2241, 2254, and
1651

A state prisoner seeking habeas relief must exhaust available state remedies. 7 9 The justification for this requirement is
80
comity; it is not a jurisdictional limitation on federal courts.
Dismissal, as opposed to a stay of proceedings, is the appropriate disposition before all state remedies have been ex170. United States ex rel. Meadows v. New York, 426 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 941 (1971).
171. Capler v. City of Greenville, 422 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1970).
172. Scarborough v. Kellum, 525 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1976); Glover v. North
Carolina, 301 F. Supp. 364 (E.D.N.C. 1969). But see Carter v. Hardy, 526 F.2d
314 (5th Cir. 1976) and Harvey v. South Dakota, 526 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 911 (1976). See also Writ of Error Coram Nobis, notes
271-289 and accompanying text infra.
173. Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534 (1975); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
174. Habeas Corpus Rule 1 (§ 2254), Advisory Committee Note.
175. 321 F. Supp. 565, 573 (S.D. Miss. 1970).
176. E.g., Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 710-11 (2d Cir. 1968) (naval
reservist denied discharge).
177. Wright v. Bailey, 544 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1976); Russell v. City of Pierre,
530 F.2d 791 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976); Edmunds v. Won
Bae Chang, 509 F.2d 39 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
178. Hill v. Johnson, 539 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1976).
179. This limitation to attacks on state convictions is applicable whether
under § 2254 or § 2241. It does not relate to attacks on federal convictions.
But see Waiver Doctrine Revisited, notes 260-70 and accompanying text
infra.
180. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 418, 430-31 (1963); Bowen v. Johnston, 306
U.S. 19, 27 (1939).
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hausted. 181
Since Fay v. Noia, the requirement has meant exhaustion
of those remedies available to the petitioner at the time of application for the writ. This was subject to the exception that a petitioner could not deliberately bypass orderly state procedures
in hopes of presenting his constitutional claim to the federal
1 82

court.

The exhaustion requirement is satisfied if a claim is
presented to the state courts. In Irby v. Missouri,183 the requirement was held by the Eighth Circuit to be "merely an accommodation of our federal system designed to give the state an
opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations" of federal rights. 8 4 Once the substance of the claim is presented so
that the state court may rule on the question, the exhaustion
requirement is satisfied.' 85 If the state court denies the claim
assume it was resolved
without a reason, the federal
186court may
adversely to the petitioner.
In Roberts v. LaVallee,187 the Supreme Court relaxed the
exhaustion doctrine to include among those who had exhausted
state remedies a petitioner who challenged a state statute which
was later struck down when it would serve no purpose to send
the case back to state court. In that case an indigent petitioner
181. Slayton v. Smith, 404 U.S. 53 (1971).

But see Montgomery v. Rum-

sfield, 572 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1978) (district court is entitled to determine
whether exhaustion is required where remedy is not a statutorily mandated
prerequisite, and court may retain jurisdiction pending exhaustion).
182. Under recent Supreme Court rulings, the deliberate bypass doctrine
also includes situations where objections not raised at trial were involuntarily waived. See Deliberate Bypass and/or Waiver Doctrine, text accompanying notes 210-34 infra.

183. 502 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1974).
184. Id. at 1098.

185. Smith v. Digmon, 434 U.S. 332 (1978) (district court committed plain

error in assuming petitioner failed to raise claim where state court con-

tained no reference to claim); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971); Girard v.

Goins, 575 F.2d 160 (8th Cir. 1978); United States ex. rel. Hickey v. Jeffes, 571

F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1978) (petitioner exhausted state remedies by presenting
claims at trial and on direct appeal, although post-conviction relief had not
been sought); Houston v. Estelle, 569 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1978) (exhaustion
satisfied if presented to, though not decided by, state courts); Anderson v.

Casscles, 531 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1976); Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir.
1975), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. Stone v. Powell 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, reh. denied, 345 U.S. 946 (1953); Cron-

non v. Alabama, 557 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1977); United States ex rel. Saiken v.
Elrod, 350 F. Supp. 1156 (N.D. Ill. 1972), vacated on other grounds,489 F.2d
865 (7th Cir. 1973) (petitioner exhausted state remedies by obtaining final

ruling from state supreme court, though postconviction remedy was still
available).
186. Thompson v. Procunier, 539 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1976). See also Smith v.
Digmon, 434 U.S. 332 (1978).
187. 389 U.S. 40 (1967).
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was denied a free transcript of the preliminary hearing. The
Virginia Supreme Court declined review, and petitioner sought
habeas relief. Subsequently the Virginia Supreme Court declared the practice denying free transcripts unconstitutional.
The case was ordered resubmitted to the state court. The
Supreme Court reversed the district court and the court of appeals, holding that resubmission would not serve any state interest. This holding was reiterated in Franciscov. Gathright,188
where the Supreme Court found it of no consequence that a
state court had declared a statute unconstitutional before the
petitioner filed for federal habeas relief. 189
1.

Exceptions

Nevertheless, situations exist where exhaustion of state
remedies is not required. Exhaustion is not required when
there is: 1) "an absence of available state corrective process,"'190
or 2) "circumstances render such process ineffective to protect
the rights of the prisoner."'19 1 It would be futile to present a
claim to a state court whose state court substantive decisions on
the particular federal right in question refuse to recognize the
claim. The Supreme Court confronted this situation in
Wilwording v. Swenson. 192
There, the Court entertained
habeas corpus petitions because Missouri state courts had
never granted hearings to prisoners concerning detention conditions. Similarly, when state courts steadfastly refused to recognize incompetence of counsel as a basis for post-conviction
19 3
relief, the federal court entertained the petition.
188. 419 U.S. 59 (1974).
189. But see Bonner v. Wyrick, 563 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1977) (Missouri
statute struck down). If the statute involved has not been interpreted by
the state courts, however, such opportunity must be provided before initiatin a federal challenge to its constitutionality. Mohr v. Jordan, 370 F. Sup.
1149 (D.Md. 1974).
ee also Franklin v. Conway, 546 F.2d 579 (4th CJr . 1976)
(case remanded to state court to determine scope of statute).

190. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Morgan v. Sielaff, 546 F.2d 218 (7th
Cir. 1976) (neither state habeas corpus nor writ of mandamus available to
challenge standard of proof for Sexually Dangerous Persons Act); Scott v.
Plante, 523 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976) (district court erroneously failed to con-

sider adequacy of state proceedings); Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231 (5th

Cir. 1976) (request for presentence credit not proper subject of collateral

attack
191.
192.
193.

in Alabama).
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976).
404 U.S. 249 (1971).
United States ex rel. Reis v. Wainwright, 525 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir.
1976). See also Stubbs v. Smith, 533 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1976) (state supreme
court recently upheld constitutionality of statutory presumption); United
States ex rel. Williams v. Brantley, 502 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1974) (firmly en-

trenched rule that prior direct appeal is res judicata on all issues raised or
which could have been raised); Mucie v. Missouri State Dept. of Corrections, 543 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1976) (nothing to indicate change in state's posi-
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Exceptional circumstances will also justify excusing a petitioner from exhausting state remedies. Such circumstances
may include inordinate delay by state courts, 1 9 the unconstitutionality of the state's obscenity statute, 95 and imposition of
96
the death penalty.
2.

Multiple Claimsfor Relief

If multiple claims for relief exist and state remedies have
been exhausted for some, but not all claims, should the entire
petition be dismissed, or only for those claims as to which state
remedies have not been exhausted? The circuits are divided.
Most recently, in Gonzalez v. Stone, 197 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a petition where state remedies had not
been exhausted as to all claims, asserting disdain for piecemeal
litigation and a desire to promote federal-state comity. The
court conceded, however, that this is not a hard and fast rule.
When certain circumstances are present such as a substantial or
undue delay in state court proceedings, or when there is a reasonable explanation for failure to allege the unexhausted claims in earlier state proceedings, then considerations of fairness may require
the court to examine the198exhausted claims while refusing to hear
the unexhausted issues.
The Fifth Circuit took a similar stance in Stinson v.
Turner v.
Alabama, 9 9 and reiterated its position in
Wainwright: "The policy of this court is to defer consideration
. . .until [the petitioner] has exhausted his state remedies on
' '200
all issues raised in his federal habeas petition.
tion on abortion statute); Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076 (1st Cir. 1973)
(state supreme court had not indicated any change in their position).
194. Jones v. Shell, 572 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1978); Mucie v. Missouri State
Dept. of Corrections, 543 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1976) (no response by state to
petition for over one year); United States ex rel. Senk v. Brierly, 471 F.2d
657 (3d Cir. 1973) (3% year wait for decision); Holland v. Swenson, 313 F.
Supp. 565 (W.D. Mo.), affd, 433 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1970) (habeas relief sought
25 years after conviction).
195. Amato v. Divine, 496 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'd after remand, 558
F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1977).
196. United States ex rel. De Vita v. McCorkle, 216 F.2d 743, 744 (3d Cir.
1954); Thomas v. Teets, 205 F.2d 236, 240 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 910
(1953). Cf Spencer v. Wainwright, 403 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1968) (may stay
execution and require exhaustion).
197. 546 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1976).
198. Id. at 810.
199. 545 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1977).
200. 550 F.2d 1012, 1013 (5th Cir. 1977) (emphasis in original). See also
Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348 (1978); Watson v. Patterson, 358 F.2d 297
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 876 (1966). But see Gaines v. Hopper, 430
F. Supp. 1173, 1175 n.4 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (court reached merits of exhausted
claims).

52

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 12:1

205
20 2
Third, 20 3 Fourth, 2 °4 and Eighth
The First, 201 Second,
Circuits have held that the court may hear those claims which
have been exhausted, at least so long as the unexhausted claims
are not related or frivolous. So far, the Seventh Circuit has remained silent on this issue.

3.

Post-Conviction Relief and Exhaustion

Peculiar problems arise in states that have post-conviction
remedies. No attempt will be made herein to analyze the various state statutes and their particular idiosyncracies. Rather,
this note is intended to warn the reader about these potential
obstacles.
20 6
For example, under the Illinois post-conviction statute,
the judgment of an appellate court operates as res judicata for
all constitutional claims of the record which might have been
raised on appeal. Thus, if a petitioner appeals his conviction,
files a post-conviction petition, but does not appeal the denial of
the petition, he has exhausted his state remedies. 20 7 Furthermore, grounds not raised in the post-conviction petition are
waived with the one exception of "fundamental fairness."
When this exception is applicable, the waiver doctrine will not
20 8
apply, and hence, state remedies are not exhausted.
Another exception recently arose in United States ex rel.
Williams v. Israel,20 9 in which the petitioner raised a claim "not
wholly within the record." Such a claim is not waived and
201. Miller v. Hall, 536 F.2d 967 (lst Cir. 1976) (dismissal of entire petition
erroneous).
202. Mercado v. Rockfeller, 502 F.2d 666, 668 n.1 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975) (jurisdiction not affected unless unexhausted
claims are both related to exhausted claim and nonfrivolous).
203. United States ex rel. Trantino v. Hatrack, 563 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1977);
United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 372 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1967).
204. Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1969) (exhaustion is
a matter of comity, not jurisdiction).
205. Girard v. Goins, 575 F.2d 160 (8th Cir. 1978); Kelsey v. Minnesota, 565
F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. United States Dist. Court, 519 F.2d 738,
740 (8th Cir. 1975) (court may consider claims that are not "interrelated and
intertwined").
206. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-1 to -7 (1977).
207. United States ex rel. Williams v. Brantley, 502 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir.

1974).
208. Id. at 1385. Federal courts, however, are aware of the very limited
application of this exception. See, e.g. United States ex rel. Bonner v. Warden, 553 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 943 (1977) (Illinois precedent existed that claim of ineffective assistance of counsel could not have
been raised on appeal where client was represented by one public defender
at trial and by another on appeal).
209. 556 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1977) (claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
could not be resolved from record).
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should be presented to the state court in a post-conviction proceeding.
C. Deliberate Bypass and Waiver Doctrine-Sections2254 and
2241210
Another potential obstacle to habeas corpus is the court created doctrine of deliberate bypass or waiver. As is now history,
the Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia held that a petitioner need
exhaust only those state remedies available at the time of application for habeas corpus. 2 11 The Court further held that the
doctrine preventing review of state court judgments, which rest
on independent and adequate state grounds, was not applicable
in habeas corpus cases. To protect the legitimate interests of
states in their procedural rules, however, Fay allowed one exception-where a defendant deliberately bypassed state procedures, he could not later complain of a violation of his federal
rights. 212 The test adopted was that of Johnson v. Zerbst,213 requiring an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
214
known right or privilege.
The standard enunciated in Fay, however, was subsequently diluted. In Davis v. United States, 2 15 the Court stated
that a collateral attack on a federal conviction for the unconstitutional composition of a grand jury was barred for failure to object, deliberately or otherwise, prior to trial. In United States ex
rel. Allum v. Twomey, 2 16 the Seventh Circuit seized upon the
reasoning in Davis to hold that the failure to object at trial to
the admissibility of evidence "gave rise to the kind of waiver
that should be placed in the same category as a 'deliberate bypass' of state remedies barring subsequent collateral attack in
'217
the federal courts.
In the last two years Davis has steadily been extended to
210. The waiver doctrine aplies to both §§ 2254 and 2255, and will be
discussed in detail regarding §2255 motions, see text accompanying notes
260-70 infra.
211. This decision bolstered the holding in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953), allowing federal courts to relitigate state prisoners' federal constitutional claims.
212. However, a state court finding of waiver does not bar an independent determination by the federal court, for waiver affecting federal rights is
a federal question. 372 U.S. at 439.
213. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
214. Id. at 464. This rule was equally applicable to § 2255 petitioners,
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 227 n.8 (1969).
215. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
216. 484 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1973).
217. Id. at 745.
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limit federal habeas relief. In Francis v. Henderson,218 the
Court applied the rationale of Davis to section 2254 petitioners
in holding that an untimely objection to a state grand jury composition barred federal review. Preservation of the integrity of
Louisiana's criminal procedure and "considerations of comity
and federalism" permitted the Louisiana statute to override the
constitutional standard. Likewise in Estelle v. Williams,219 the
failure to object to standing trial in prison garb absent any compulsion by the state negated whatever constitutional violation
occurred.
Finally, in Wainwright v. Sykes,220 the Supreme Court held

that failure to comply with the Florida contemporaneous objection rule, which requires motions to suppress evidence, including confessions, to be made before trial, barred consideration of
a claim of coerced confession. Mr. Justice Rehnquist stated the
issue and resolution as: "Shall the rule of Francisv. Henderson,
barring federal habeas review absent a showing of 'cause' and
'prejudice' attendant to a state procedural waiver, be applied to
a waived objection to admission of a confession at trial? We an'221
swer that question in the affirmative."
Gone are the days of knowing and deliberate waivers of orderly state procedures. 222 The new standard is that used in
Wainwright and Davis.223 Review via federal habeas corpus
petition is barred absent a showing of cause for failure to raise a
claim, and some showing of actual prejudice resulting from the
alleged constitutional violation. 224 Thus, the burden has shifted
from requiring the prosecution to show a knowing and intelligent waiver to requiring the petitioner to show cause and
prejudice.
Only two minute rays of optimism remain in the area of deliberate bypass and waiver. In Henderson v. Kibbe,22 5 the petitioner failed to object to the omission of an instruction on
218. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
219. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
220. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).

221. 433 U.S. at 87. See also Habeas Corpus and the Burger Court, text
accompanying notes 32-48 supra. But see Berrier v. Egeler, 583 F.2d 515

(6th Cir. 178 (plain error not raised below is no bar to habeas corpus in
state with contemporaneous objection below.).
222. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 517 (1972) (waiver must be the

product of an understanding and knowing decision by petitioner); Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See also Sincox v. United States, 571 F.2d 876 (5th

Cir. 1978) (failure to object to nonunanimous verdict did not amount to
waiver of right to unanimous jury verdict).
223. See text accompanying notes 32-48 supra.
224. 433 U.S. 85-86 (1977).
225. 431 U.S. 145 (1977).
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causation for second degree murder. Although the Court reversed the grant of the writ, it did not rely on waiver grounds but
addressed the merits of the claim. The majority cited Cupp v.
Naughten,226 to determine "whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. '227 Mr. Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, emphasized that "[iut is a rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction
when no objection has been made in the trial court. '228 In a
concurring opinion, howver, Chief Justice Burger opined that
the identical result should have been reached, but based on the
failure to object to the jury instructions at the time they were
229
given, or on a waiver theory.
The second ray is an avenue left open by Francis v.
Henderson.230 When the state court voluntarily considers a
claim on its merits, though untimely raised, the federal courts
are also free to do So. 2 3 1 This allowed the petitioners to challenge the grand jury selection process in Castaneda v.
232
Partida.
Though the objection was not timely raised, the
Texas courts considered the claim on the merits. Hence, the
federal habeas court could consider it.233 In addition, if the
state would hear the petitioner's claims at any other stage of the
proceedings, though not raised at trial, such claims may also be
234
raised on federal habeas review.
IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
A petition for writ of habeas corpus (section 2254, section
2241) may be ified either in the district court wherein the peti226. 414 U.S. 141 (1973).
227. 414 U.S. at 147.
228. 431 U.S. at 154.
229. 431 U.S. at 91-94. As for nonconstitutional claims, those not raised
on appeal are not reviewable in collateral proceedings, unless so fundamental as to deny due process, Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962). Though
Hill involved the scope of § 2255, it has been equated to relief allowable
under § 2254, see e.g., Vitello v. Gaughan, 544 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 904 (1977). See also Forbes v. Estelle, 559 F.2d 967 (5th Cir.
1977) (unless state procedure denied fundamental fairness, not reviewable
by habeas corpus).
230. 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
231. Id. at 542 n.5 (1976).

232. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
233. Id. at 1275 n.4. See also United States ex rel. Ross v. Fike, 534 F.2d
731 (7th Cir. 1976).
234. Jones v. Wisconsin, 562 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1977) (Wisconsin statute
allowed attack after guilty plea). Journingan v. Duffy, 552 F.2d 283 (9th Cir.
1977) (guilty plea is not forfeiture of claims under California law); Malley v.
Manson, 547 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 918 (1977) (Connecticut law allowed claim to be raised for first time on appeal).
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tioner is confined or where the conviction occurred. 235 If, within
the state of conviction these two districts are different, the district court that received the petition has discretion to transfer
236
the case "in the interests of justice."
This latitude is not available to federal prisoners seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. section 2255.237

These motions must be

brought in the sentencing court. In enacting section 2255, Congress was particularly concerned with venue because of the difficulty and expense of transporting prisoners, the availability of
witnesses and records, communications generally between attorney and client, and the unequal distribution of habeas petitions throughout the district court system. After weighing
these factors, Congress decided that for federal prisoners the
238
scales tipped in favor of the district of conviction.
The opposite is true, however, for federal prisoners seeking
general habeas relief under section 2241. Not only would the
place of conviction be an extremely inconvenient forum for federal prisoners who wish to challenge the fact or duration of their
confinement, but also, it would be an inappropriate forum under
28 U.S.C. section 2241. Under this section the district court
23 9
needs only jurisdiction over the custodian of the prisoner.

24 °
The custodian is determined at the time the petition is filed.

Thus, where a person in federal custody wishes to challenge loss
of good time credits,24 1 parole board decisions, 242 execution of
235. R. SOKOL,

FEDERAL HABEAS CoRPus § 8 (2d ed. 1969). The procedure
ning§ 2254 proceedings is contained in both § 2254 and its rules and in
U.S.C. §§ 2241-2253. In case of conflict between the rules and §§ 2241-2253,
the rules will govern. 28 U.S.C. §2072 (1976).
236. With state prisoners seeking § 2254 relief, generally, the state of conviction and of confinement will be the same. If not, the district wherein the
conviction was had will be the better forum. See e.g., Wilkins v. Erickson,
484 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1973) (petitioner convicted in Montana imprisoned in
South Dakota pursuant to interstate agreement).
237. Prior to 1948, all federal prisoners seeking habeas relief had to file
their petitions in the district where they were confined. The burden of this
restriction fell on the five districts in which the federal penitentiaries were
located. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
238. Id. at 214-219. See also S. REP. No. 1502, 89TH CONG. 2D SESS. (1966),
reprinted in 11966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 2968, 2969-74.
239. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky. 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973).
Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341, 343 (1972). But see Dillworth v. Barker, 465 F.2d
1338 (5th Cir. 1972) (custodian present pursuant to Uniform Act for Out-ofState Parole Supervision).
240. Propotnik v. Putman, 538 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1976); Ross v. Mebane,
536 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1976) (transfer of prisoner did not defeat jurisdiction).
241. Propotnik v. Putman, 538 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1976) (petition ified sub-

sequent to transfer, court had no jurisdiction over either prisoner or custodian); Ross v. Mebane, 536 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1976) (district court had

jurisdiction over petition though prisoner was subsequently transferred).
242. McCoy v. United States Bd. of Parole, 537 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1976)
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sentence, 24 3 custody of aliens in United States detained against
245
their will,2 44 or the validity of a state detainer or conviction,
the district court with jurisdiction over the custodian is the
proper forum, although convenience may dictate transfer to the
24
place of detention.

Where is the custodian for a state prisoner who seeks to
challenge the legality of an out-of-state detainer? The Supreme
Court addressed this issue in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit
Court of Kentucky.2 47 The Court held that an Alabama prisoner could seek a writ of habeas corpus to compel the state of
Kentucky, which had lodged a detainer against him, to give him
a speedy trial in the district court of Kentucky. The opinion discredited the holding of Ahrens v. Clark,248 which stated that

habeas corpus jurisdiction is limited to cases where the prisoner
is within the court's territorial jurisdiction. 249 In contrast to
Ahrens, the reasoning in Braden seems improved. The state of
confinement acts "as agent for the demanding state. '250 The
former state, Alabama here, has no interest in the outcome of
the case. All documents and records were in Kentucky. Moreover, a judge sitting in the district court of Kentucky would be
more familiar with that state's law than a district judge in Alabama.251
(failure to hold prompt parole revocation hearing; since parole board was
custodian, it was properly served at regional office, and transfer to place of
confinement was proper); Harbolt v. Carpenter, 536 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1976)
(outstanding parole violation warrant; venue proper where Regional Director located; transfer, not dismissal, remedy for inconvenience); Reese v.
United States Bd. of Parole, 498 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Washington, D.C.
is proper forum for suit against parole board, transfer to place of confinement also proper).
243. Andrino v. United States Bd. of Parole, 550 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Clinkenbeard, 542 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1976); Gomori v. Arnold,
533 F.2d 871 (3d Cir.), cert.denied, 429 U.S. 851 (1976) (error in computation
of concurrent time following transfer from state institution).
244. Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975).
245. Orito v. Powers, 479 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1973) (where petitioner was
released on bail, district court of issuing state had jurisdiction).
246. Ross v. Mebane, 536 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1976) (subsequent transfer
does not defeat jurisdiction, though convenience may dictate transfer to

place of confinement).
247. 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
248. 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
249. Ahrens v. Clark, supra note 248, had already been overruled in part
by the special venue sections in 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976).
250. 410 U.S. at 498.
251. See also Wilkins v. Erickson, 484 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1973) (state of
conviction was proper forum for challenge, where state of confinement was

only acting as agent).

Compare Noll v. Nebraska, 537 F.2d 967 (8th Cir.

1976) and Craig v. Beto, 458 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1972) (where prior out-ofstate conviction enhances current conviction, state of current conviction is

proper forum).
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28 U.S.C. SECTION 2255-MOTION ATrACKING SENTENCE
Sections 2255, 2241, and FederalRule 35 of Criminal
Procedure-A Comparison

A section 2255 motion is not the exclusive post-conviction
remedy for federal prisoners. When this motion is "inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention, 252 federal

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. section 2241 is available for such
collateral attacks. For example, challenges to illegal actions of a
parole board, as revoking parole or probation without cause, are
not cognizable by a section 2255 motion. Since parole or probation revocation is not part of the original proceeding, any violations arising from revocation should be attacked by federal
habeas corpus under section 2241.253 Matters concerning the
execution of the sentence are also challenged under section
54
2241.2
Another remedy, Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, is available to attack illegal sentences or those imposed in an illegal manner, or to seek reduction of a sentence.
Though Rule 35 has no "in custody" requirement, 25 5 it does
carry a 120-day time limit.256 The basic difference between
these two provisions is that Rule 35 does not attack the legality
252. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). For criminal convictions in the District of
Columbia Superior Court, see D.C. Code § 23-110(g) (1973) patterned after §
2255. § 2255 is no longer available to prisoners convicted in the District. A
petitioner may petition the District Court for a writ of habeas corpus only if
the remedy by motion under the D.C. Code is inadequate or ineffective to
test the legality of the detention. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S.. 372 (1977).
253. See Grosso v. Norton, 520 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1975); Garafola v. Benson,
505 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir. 1974) (habeas corpus petitions of federal prisoners
sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a) (2) granted where parole board refused
to hold parole hearings prior to expiration of one-third of sentence). See
also Jacobson v. United States, 542 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1976) (court would
only have jurisdiction over claim that parole hearing was not meaningful
because of erroneous evidence under 28 U.S.C. § 2241); Thompson v. United
States, 536 F.2d 459 (1st Cir. 1976) (§ 2255 motion not proper avenue to attack execution of sentence); United States v. DiRusso,535 F.2d 673 (1st Cir.
1976) (application of parole guidelines). But see Kortness v. United States,
514 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Slutsky, 514 F.2d 1222 (2d Cir.
1975) (where trial court was not aware at sentencing of change in parole
board guidelines, sentencing court could modify sentences under § 2255 or
Rule 35).
254. Gomori v. Arnold, 533 F.2d 871 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 851
(1976) (effects of events subsequent to sentence cognizable via habeas
corpus). See also notes 65 and 243 supra.
255. Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 , 422 (1959).
256. An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time, but to correct a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, or to reduce the sentence, the motion must be filed within 120 days after sentence is imposed or within 120
days after receipt by the court of the mandate issued on affirmance of the
judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within 120 days after entry of an
order of the Supreme Court denying review or upholding the conviction.

19781

CollateralAttacks on Convictions

of the underlying conviction, whereas section 2255 does.

257

The provisions of section 2255 and Rule 35 overlap somewhat, particularly in the area of "illegal sentence," a term which
has not yet been adequately defined. Obvious examples, however, would be punishment in excess of the statutory maximum
or multiple terms for the same offense. 258 In any event, whether
the action is brought as a Rule 35 motion, a section 2255 motion,
or a writ of error coram nobis, the court should construe it acunder the circumstances, and
cording to which one is proper
259
then proceed on the merits.
B.

Waiver Doctrine Revisited

While there is no exhaustion problem for section 2255 petitions, there is a waiver problem, particularly regarding nonconstitutional errors. In presenting objections to nonconstitutional
errors in a section 2255 petition that have not been raised below,
the error must be "a complete miscarriage of justice" and in260
volve exceptional circumstances.
In Sunal v. Large,26 1 petitioners were not permitted to attack by habeas petition the trial court's failure to allow a nonconstitutional defense where no appeal was taken from the
conviction, even though there was an intervening change of law
which subsequently recognized the defense. The Court stated:
So far as convictions obtained in the federal courts are concerned,
the general rule is that the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed to do service for an appeal. There have been, however, some
exceptions ....
Illustrative are those instances where the conviction was under a federal statute alleged to be unconstitutional,
where the conviction was by a federal court whose jurisdiction over
the person or the offense was challenged, where the trial or sentence by a federal court violated specific constitutional guarantees.
collateral reIt is plain, however, that the writ is not designed for
2 62
view of errors of law committed by the trial court.
257. See Habeas Corpus Rule 2 (§ 2255), Advisory Committee Note,
reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
258.

See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 430 (1962).

259. See Habeas Corpus Rule 2 (§ 2255), Advisory Committee Note; 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). This flexible approach has been utilized particularly

where the 120 day time for a Rule 35 motion has passed. See, e.g., United
States v. McCarthy, 433 F.2d 591 (lst Cir. 1970); United States v. Coke, 404
F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968); Jones v. United States, 400 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 991 (1969); United States v. Lewis, 392 F.2d 440 (4th Cir.
1968). See also F.R. Crum. P. 33, which provides that a motion for new trial
may be granted in the interest of justice. The applicable time limits are: 2
years after final judgment for newly discovered evidence; and 7 days after
verdict or finding of guilty on any other grounds.
260. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. at 428-29 (1962).
261. 332 U.S. 174 (1947).
262. Id. at 178-79.
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In Hill v. United States,263 the Court held that to present

nonconstitutional claims at all in a section 2255 motion, the
claimed error must be a "fundamental defect which inherently
results in a complete miscarriage of justice," and it must "present exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy
becomes apparent." 264 The Court affirmed the denial of a section 2255 motion where the evidence showed a failure to comply
with the formal requirements of Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure which directs the court to allow the defendant to make a statement on his own behalf at sentencing.
The error was not cognizable in the absence of any prejudice to
the petitioner; indeed, it was not even alleged that the petitioner
would have said anything if allowed to. Hence the defect was
not fundamental, nor did it result in a miscarriage of justice.
Exceptional circumstances were, however, found in Sosa v.
United States,265 where an intervening Supreme Court decision
required the reversal of similar convictions based on evidence
obtained by a "chekar" signal alone. The petitioners were
granted leave to dismiss their appeal for the purpose of permitting the trial court to vacate the judgment and sentence on a
section 2255 motion. The motion was granted and the govern266
ment appealed. The government, relying on Fay v. Noia,
contended that this was a "deliberate bypass," and thereby forfeited any right to section 2255 relief. Noting that the "deliberate bypass" doctrine is not a jurisdictional doctrine, but an
equitable one relating to the appropriate exercise of power, the
Fifth Circuit held:
Our cases firmly reject any rigid application of the rule against surrogate appeals. Instead, they establish the principle that habeas

will not be permitted to substitute for an appeal when the choice to
seek habeas relief is made in267
order to seize some legal or tactical
defendant.

advantage for the
In Kaufman v. United States,268 petitioner alleged in a section 2255 motion that a finding of sanity was based on admission
263. 368 U.S. 424 (1962). See also Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939).
264. Id. at 428-29.
265. 550 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1977). See also Davis v. United States, 417 U.S.
333 (1974), ("fundamental defect 'and "exceptional circumstances" present,
though claim was raised below), and notes 29-31 and accompanying text
supra.
266. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
267. 550 F.2d at 248.
268. 394 U.S. 217 (1969). In the interim, the Court has decided Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), which, although not overruling Kaufnan, cast
doubt on its continued viability. The Court rejected the 'dictum in
Kaufman concerning the applicability of the exclusionary rule in federal
habeas corpus review of state court decisions pursuant to § 2254." 428 U.S.
468, 481 n.16.
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of evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment. The
only defense was insanity. The objection was raised at trial but
not on appeal. The district court denied relief because the constitutional claim was not raised on appeal. Recalling that Sunal
v. Large,269 did not require waiver of constitutional claims not
raised on appeal, the Supreme Court held that there was no reason to restrict federal prisoners from asserting fourth amendment violations in a section 2255 motion where there was no
similar restriction on state prisoners seeking section 2254
habeas relief.
Claims of constitutional errors can be waived when specific
rules require them to be raised at a certain time. In Davis v.
United States,270 the petitioner attacked the composition of the
grand jury three years after his conviction. Under Rule
12 (b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, objections
to defects in the institution of prosecution or in the indictment
must be raised before trial. The claim was first raised in the
section 2255 motion. Although a constitutional claim was involved, the Rule specifically provided that failure to object at the
proper time constituted a waiver of all such claims in the absence of a showing of "cause" for relief from the waiver. The
Court distinguished Kaufman on the ground that there was no
such waiver provision involved. Section 2255 did not limit or
preclude the assertion of the claim, rather, the separate provisions of Rule 12(b) (2) precluded the petitioner from raising the
claim at a later date.
VI.

28 U.S.C. SECTION 1651-WRIT

OF ERROR CoRAM NOBIS

Another, though not so widely used vehicle for attack on
federal convictions, 271 is the writ of error coram nobis provided
in 28 U.S.C. section 1651(a). As there is no requirement that the
petitioner be "in custody," the writ can be sought long after the
petitioner has been unconditionally released from federal custody.272 This is the most important function of the writ in cur269. 332 U.S. 174 (1947).
270. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
271. The writ cannot issue to set aside state convictions. Theriault v. Mississippi, 390 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1968). But see Jackson v. Louisiana, 452 F.2d
451 (5th Cir. 1971); Peterson v. Missouri, 355 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D. Mo. 1973)
(petitioner was allowed to attack state court convictions which enhanced
federal sentence then being served). It is suggested that the better way to
attack a prior state conviction which is used to enhance a current federal
sentence is via § 2255. See note 127 supra.
272. In Deckard v. United States, 381 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1967), the petitioner
was allowed to attack the last of three consecutive sentences as violative of
his right against self-incrimination. Under the new rules governing § 2255
proceedings, Habeas Corpus Rule 1(2), it is suggested that the petitioner
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rent criminal practice.
At common law, the writ allowed a court to review a conviction based on an alleged error of fact affecting the validity and
regularity of the proceedings that did not appear on the face of
the record (the literal meaning is "let the record remain before
us").273 Today the writ is regarded as a step in the criminal proceeding and may be used to correct any fundamental errors
which render the proceeding invalid. 2 4 Like a section 2255 moand must be brought
tion, it is a step in the criminal proceeding,
275
in the court that imposed the penalty.
In United States v. Morgan,276 the Supreme Court sought to

limit the scope of this relief stating that "[c ] ontinuation of litigation after final judgment and exhaustion or waiver of any statutory right of review should be allowed through this
circumstances compelling
extraordinary remedy only under
'27 7
such action to achieve justice.
The power of the court to vacate judgments exists only
'278
where the errors are "of the most fundamental character.
Thus, Morgan added an "exhaustion" requirement to application for this writ. Furthermore, the writ of coram nobis has
when his statutory remebeen held to be open to a prisoner only
279
dies are unavailable or inadequate.
The limitation to factual errors as.grounds for coram nobis
relief has been extended. The Reviser's Notes to section 2255
state that "this section [2255] restates, clarifies, and simplifies
the procedure in the nature of the ancient writ of error coram
nobis," except of course that section 2255 has the "in custody"
requirement. Most courts now consider the grounds for issuance of this writ as coterminous with the grounds for section
or the grounds for issuance of a writ of habeas
2255 relief
280
corpus.
Possible grounds for the issuance of a writ under section
1651 include: review of prior invalid federal conviction used to
was "in custody" for purposes of a § 2255 motion, and such a motion is the
better way to attack the conviction.

273. For a history of some common law uses, see United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
274. Abel v. Tinsley, 338 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1964).

275. Robson v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 631 (E.D. Pa.), vacated on
other grounds, 404 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1968).

276. 346 U.S. 502(1954).
277. Id. at 511.

278. Id. at 512, quoting United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55 (1914).

279. Correa-Negron v. United States, 473 F.2d 684 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 870 (1973).
280. United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 930 (1975).
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enhance state sentence; 281 review of sentencing error which resulted in an adult criminal record and handicapped employment
opportunities; 282 review of conviction where there has been a
subsequent change in the law; 283 entry of plea without assistance of counsel;284 mental capacity; 285 recovery of fines paid for

conviction under a statute later declared unconstitutional; 286 seexlective prosecution; 2 87 subsequent changes in the law; 288 or 289
punging records where the indictment had been dismissed.
VII.

A.

PROCEDURE

Procedure Governing Section 2254 and 2255 Proceedings

The procedure surrounding post-conviction petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 2254 and 2255 has, for the most part, not
caused substantial difficulty. The procedure governing section
2254 petitions is contained in 28 U.S.C. sections 2241-2253, and in
the Rules governing sections 2254 proceedings 290 for the United
States District Courts, promulgated by the Supreme Court and
made effective February 1, 1977.291 The procedure governing
281. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
282. Rewak v. United States, 512 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1975) (no finding that
19 year old defendant would not benefit from Youth Corrections Act; collat-

eral consequences handicapped petitioner in obtaining employment as security guard or nurse so that court was allowed to resentence petitioner in
light of his good record since conviction).
283. United States v. Travers, 514 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 1974) (subsequent to
conviction and sentence for mail fraud, Supreme Court held that proof must
establish relation between mailing and scheme, which it had not done at
petitioner's trial).
284. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); Correa-Negron v.
United States, 473 F.2d 684 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 870 (1973) (also
failure to advise of constitutional rights and consequences of guilty plea);
United States v. Liska, 409 F. Supp. 1405 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (also voluntariness
of guilty plea).
285. Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1965) (attack allowed
before sentence had begun).
286. Pasha v. United States, 484 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1973); Lawson v. United
States, 397 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Ga. 1975); United States v. Russo, 358 F. Supp.
436 (D.N.J. 1973); United States v. Summa, 362 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1972);
United States v. Lewis, 342 F. Supp. 833, (E.D. La. 1972) (failure to report
wagering income).
287. United States v. Danks, 357 F. Supp. 193 (D. Haw. 1973) (fine recoverable where defendant was target of constitutionally impermissible discrimination).
288. United States v. Loschiavo, 531 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1976) (petitioner
convicted of bribing public official who was held not to be public official in
subsequent case).
289. United States v. Bohr, 406 F. Supp. 1218 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
290. In any case where there is a conflict between the Rules and the statutes, the Rules shall govern. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
291. Act of Sept. 28, 1976, Pub. L. 94-426, 90 Stat. 1334. The Habeas Corpus
Rules for § 2254 proceedings and for § 2255 proceedings, together with Advi-
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section 2255 motions is contained only in the Rules governing
section 2255 proceedings for the United States District Courts,
again promulgated by the United States Supreme Court and
made effective February 1, 1977.292
Because of space limitations, the procedures will be summarized as imply as possible. In this regard, one should consult the Rules, and particularly the notes of the Advisory
Committee. Changes in prior law, and changes between what
was originally proposed and what became effective will not generally be noted, but only those procedures presently required.
B. ProceduralComparisonof Sections 2254 and 2255
Section 2254 governs federal habeas relief for state prisoners. Section 2255 basically covers challenges to federal convictions and sentences. A section 2254 proceeding commences by
a petition and is a new civil proceeding. A section 2255 proceeding, however, is a motion in the original federal criminal pro29 3
ceeding.
A section 2254 petition will be sustained because some
right-as lack of counsel-has been denied to the petitioner.
The writ does not pertain to the determination of guilt or innocence, but only to the fairness of the criminal trial. Even
though the court has power "to dispose of the matters as law
and justice require, ' '294 the relief obtainable in a section 2254
proceeding is less than that possible in a section 2255 proceeding. Under section 2255 the court in granting the appropriate
relief may discharge the prisoner, resentence the prisoner, grant
a new trial, or correct the sentence.
1.

Form of Petitionor Motion

A section 2254 petition and section 2255 motion shall be in
the form of the models following as Appendices A and B, unless
the local district court has adopted a local form. Substantial
compliance with the models will generally meet the requirements of Habeas Corpus Rule 2 (section 2254) and 28 U.S.C. secsory Committee Notes, are reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and in 28 U.S.C. §
2255 (1976). The Rules are applicable only to proceedings commenced on
or after February 1, 1977. Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill.,
434 U.S. 257, 265 n.9 (1978).
292. See id.
293. Though a § 2255 proceeding is a further step in the criminal case, it

will not necessarily be governed by all of the legal principles which govern a
criminal trial, such as counsel, presence, confrontation, self-incrimination
and burden of proof. See Advisory Committee Note, Rule 1 (§ 2255), supra
note 291.

294. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1976).
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tion 2242 for section 2254 proceedings and Habeas Corpus Rule 2
(section 2255) for section 2255 proceedings.
Habeas Corpus Rule 2(b) (section 2254) requires the respondents to be the officer having present custody of the petitioner and the attorney general of the state in which the
judgment being attacked was entered. In section 2255 proceedings the parties will be the parties in the original suit (i.e. the
moving party and the United States). If the moving party in a
section 2255 proceeding is in the custody of a state court, that
custodian need not be included as a respondent.
Habeas Corpus Rules 2(c) (section 2254) and 2(b) (section
2255) require that the district court clerk make copies of the
model petition, or the local form if different, available free of
charge upon request. The petition or motion may be typewritten or legibly handwritten, and must be signed and sworn to by
the petitioner or individual acting on that person's behalf.
More importantly, Habeas Corpus Rules 2(c) (section 2254)
and 2 (b) (section 2255) require that all available grounds for relief be presented at once with facts in support, including those
grounds of which by the exercise of reasonable diligence, the
petitioner should be aware. The requirement should be read
with Habeas Corpus Rules 9(b) (sections 2254 and 2255) requiring dismissal of a second petition or motion which fails to allege
new grounds, or, if new grounds are alleged, the judge finds that
the failure to assert those grounds in the prior pleading constitutes an abuse of the procedure, or, as the Advisory Committee
Notes suggest, "an unexcusable failure." The petition or motion
shall also describe the relief requested.
Habeas Corpus Rule 2(d) (section 2254) requires that a petition be limited to the assertion of a claim for relief against the
"judgment or judgments" of a single state court. If two or more
state courts are involved, separate petitions must be filed. If a
petitioner wants to challenge more than one judgment of a single court, the claims may be combined in a single petition, or
stated in separate petitions.2 95 In contrast, Habeas Corpus Rule
2(c) (section 2255) requires that a motion be directed to only
one judgment. A separate motion must be filed to attack any
other judgment.
Habeas Corpus Rules 2(e) (section 2254) and 2(d) (section
2255) provide that if a petition or motion received by the court
does not substantially comply with the requirements of Rules 2
or 3, it may be returned to the petitioner with a statement of the
295. See Advisory Committee Note, Habeas Corpus Rule 2(§ 2254),
supra note 291.
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reason for its return if a judge of the court so directs. The clerk
of court, upon returning the pleading will retain a copy of it.
Thus if the petitioner claims that the original pleading was in
compliance with the rules, the court has a ready reference.
2.

Filing and Service of Section 2254 Petition

Ordinarily, a petition should be filed in the office of the clerk
two
of the district court. The petition must be accompanied by
296 If
conformed copies and by the filing fee prescribed by law.
the petitioner desires to prosecute the petition in forma
pauperis,an affidavit required by 28 U.S.C. section 1915 must be
filed. The affidavit must be accompanied by a certificate of the
warden or other appropriate custodial officer indicating297 the
If
amount of funds in the petitioner's institutional account.
the petitioner is on probation or parole, the Advisory Committee
Notes suggest that the court may wish to require a similar
298
certificate from the supervising officer.
The clerk will docket the petition upon a receipt of the filing
fee or an order granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Habeas Corpus Rule 3(b) (section 2254) specifically provides
that the filing of the petition shall not require the respondent to
answer or otherwise move with respect to it unless ordered by
the court.
3.

Filing and Service of Section 2255 Motion

A motion shall be fied with two conformed copies in the office of the clerk of the district court. In this respect Habeas
Corpus Rule 3 (section 2255) is not artfully drafted. However, it
undoubtedly means the office of the clerk in the district where
the movant was convicted and sentenced. The clerk will serve a
copy on the United States Attorney. The United States Attorney need not answer or otherwise move with respect to the motion unless so ordered by the court.
Previously there was a filing fee of $15.00 for opening a section 2255 proceeding. The Advisory Committee Notes suggest
that no filing fee be required since this is a motion in the original
criminal proceeding. Technically there would then be no need
296. Habeas Corpus Rule 3 (§ 2254), supra note 291. 28 U.S.C. §
1914(a) (1976) (presently requires a $5.00 filing fee).
297. See Habeas Corpus Rule 3(a) (§ 2254), supra note 291.
298. In an effort to discourage in forma pauperis proceedings, the Advi-

sory Committee also suggests that a district court might by local rule require that any amount credited to a petitioner, in excess of a stated
maximum, must be used for the payment of a filing fee. See Habeas

Corpus Rule 3 (§ 2254), supra note 291.
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for an informa pauperis affidavit. The affidavit is nevertheless
recommended since it constitutes evidence in the record of indigency that a judge can rely upon in appointing counsel, having
the government pay witness fees, allowing the docketing of an
appeal,
or granting other rights to which an indigent may be en29 9
titled.
4.

PreliminaryConsiderationby the Court

Under Habeas Corpus Rule 4 (section 2254) and 28 U.S.C.
section 2243, the court is authorized to weed out petitions that
plainly show a petitioner is not entitled to relief. The court will
300
consider the petition and any exhibits including transcripts,
sentencing records, and copies of state court opinions. If some
of these items are not included as exhibits to the petition, the
judge may order them.
Habeas Corpus Rule 4 (section 2255) provides that the motion shall be sent to the judge who tried and sentenced the movant. If the sentencing judge is not the trial judge, then the
petition shall go to the judge who was in charge of that part of
the proceeding now being attacked by the movant. If the appropriate judge is not available, then the case shall be assigned to
another district judge in accordance with the local rules governing assignment of cases. Since the section 2255 motion is
part of the criminal action, the files, records, transcripts, and cor3 01
respondence will normally be available to the court.
The court must give the petitioner's claims careful and plenary consideration, including a full opportunity to present all
relevant facts. 3° 2 If the court does not summarily dismiss the
petition or motion for lack of merit, it shall order an answer or
other pleading within such time as it fixes or may take any other
299. Even though movant is permitted to proceed in forma pauperis he

will not be entitled to a free transcript unless the district court makes an
initial finding that the motion is not frivolous and that a transcript is needed
to decide the issues presented. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317
(1976).
300. See 28 U.S.C. § 753(f) (1976) authorizing payment for transcripts in
habeas corpus cases. Transcripts will not be ordered without a certification
of nonfrivolity and need. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976).
301. Thus, the more detailed provisions about what will be required or
considered in connection with § 2254 proceedings are not necessary here.
Nevertheless, the Court has the power to require anything it needs.
302. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977); White v. Finkbeiner, 570
F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1978) (case remanded for third evidentiary hearing where
findings of fact were inadequate); Burkhart v. Lane, 574 F.2d 346 (6th Cir.
1978) (district court erred in summarily dismissing petition without deter-

mining if nontestifying codefendant's confession improperly incriminated
defendant); Scott v. Estelle, 567 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1978) (error to decide motion for summary judgment on affadavits and magistrate's ex parte communication with witness where genuine issue of fact existed).
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action it deems appropriate. Whether or not the court orders a
response, a copy of the petition or motion and any order of the
court will be served by certified mail on the respondent and on
the attorney general of the state involved, or on the United
States Attorney.
The phrase in Habeas Corpus Rules 4 (sections 2254 and
2255) that the court may "take such other action as the judge
deems appropriate" is described as follows by the Advisory
Committee Note (this note relates to section 2254, but would in
part be applicable to the same language in Rule 4 (section
2255)):
Rule 4 authorizes the judge to "take such other action as the judge
deems appropriate." This is designed to afford the judge flexibility
in a case where either dismissal or an order to answer may be inappropriate. For example, the judge may want to authorize the respondent to make a motion to dismiss based on information
furnished by respondent, which may show that petitioner's claims

have already been decided on the merits in a federal court; that

petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies, that the petitioner
is not in custody within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254; or that a

decision in the matter is pending in state court. In these situations, a dismissal may be called for on procedural grounds, which
may avoid burdening the respondent with the necessity of filing an
answer on the substantive merits of the petition. In other situations, the judge may want to consider a motion from respondent to
make the petition more certain. Or the judge may want to dismiss
some allegations in the petition, requiring the respondent to answer only those claims which appear to have some arguable merit.
It is clear that at this stage the court may grant the petition

or motion. For there are situations where "on the facts admitted, it may appear that, as a matter of law, the prisoner is entitled to the writ and to a discharge. '30 3 This possibility was
recently reiterated in Browder v. Director,Department of Cor3°4
rections of Illinois.
5.

Contents of Answer in Section 2254 Proceeding

28 U.S.C. section 2243 required little specificity in response
to a petition. As a result, indefinite responses prevailed. Many
answers were form responses, and thus of little or no help to the
court.
This practice, however, has been curtailed by the enactment
of the Habeas Corpus Rules. Habeas Corpus Rule 5 (section
2254) requires that the answer shall respond to the allegations of
the petition. In addition, the rule compels the answer to address itself to certain specific items. First, the answer must
303. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 284 (1941).
304. 434 U.S. 257 (1978).
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state whether petitioner has exhausted state remedies including
any post-conviction remedy available under the statutes or procedural rules of the state, and any right to appeal from any adverse judgment or order in a post-conviction proceeding. The
answer shall indicate what transcripts (pre-trial, trial, sentencing and post-conviction) are available, when they can be furnished, and also what proceedings have been recorded but not
transcribed. The answering party should attach to the answer
portions of the transcript that it considers relevant.3 0 5 Still the
court may request additional transcripts or portions thereof.
The above Rule provides that if a transcript is not available
or procurable, a narrative summary of the evidence may be submitted. The Rule also states that if the petitioner appeals from
a conviction or from any post-conviction proceeding, a copy of
petitioner's brief on appeal and of the opinion of the appellate
court must be filed by the respondent with the answer.
Habeas Corpus Rule 5 (section 2254) does not require that
an answer be served upon the petitioner or his attorney. Nevertheless, it should be so served, for undoubtedly Rule 5 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Proceduro would be applicable in this
case.
28 U.S.C. section 2248 requires that an answer (called there
a return) would be presumed true if not "traversed" (replied to)
unless the judge found otherwise. Since no reply is required by
the Habeas Corpus Rules, the assumption of truthfulness is no
longer applicable. 3° 6 Thus, when a petition and answer present
a material issue of fact, evidence is required to resolve the issue.
In addition, under Habeas Corpus Rule 11 (section 2254) the
court is given discretion to incorporate the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, hence Rule 15(a) of those rules can be employed to allow a petitioner to amend his petition if necessary.
Also, one should note that the new Habeas Corpus Rules do
not prevent a respondent from filing a pleading other than an
answer.307 Thus, if the respondent determines that state remedies have not been exhausted, a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment may be fied instead of a formal answer.
However, the purpose of the new Rules is to avoid delay and
hence the court should not countenance any frivolous or "form"
motions.
305. In addition, the respondent may attach whatever else is deemed
necessary or helpful. See Habeas Corpus Rule 5 (§ 2254), Advisory Committee Note, supra note 291.
306. Id.
307. See Habeas Corpus Rule 4 (§ 2254), Advisory Committee Notes,
supra note 291. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977).
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Contents of Answer in Section 2255 Proceeding

Section 2255 does not specifically call for an answer by the
United States Attorney. Habeas Corpus Rule 4 (section 2255)
provides that the court may order one, and Habeas Corpus Rule
5 (section 2255) provides that if an answer is ordered, it must
respond to the allegations of the motion. In addition, it shall
state whether the moving party has used other available federal
remedies, including prior post-conviction motions or proceedings that existed prior to the adoption of these Rules. The answer shall also state whether an evidentiary hearing was
an answer will not
accorded in a federal court. The ordering 3of
08
preclude the filing of appropriate motions.
After examining the record, the court can order the government to supplement its answer if there is any material still
needed. Habeas Corpus Rule 5 (section 2255), perhaps in recognition that the government sometimes moves slowly, states that
the court shall allow the government an appropriate amount of
time in which to supplement the record, but that the time shall
not unduly delay the consideration of the motion.
There is no requirement under section 2255, unlike section
2254, that a party exhaust other remedies. Many courts, however, have held that a section 2255 motion is not appropriate if
the moving party is simultaneously pursuing an appeal. This 30is9
not a matter of jurisdiction, but of orderly judicial 3procedures.
10
There may also be problems of waiver of claims.
7. Discovery
Habeas Corpus Rule 6 (section 2254) provides that all the
discovery devices available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are available to parties in a habeas corpus proceeding "to
the extent that, the judge in the exercise of his discretion and
for good cause shown grants leave to do so." Habeas Corpus
Rule 6 (section 2255) is identical plus whatever discovery devices are available under the Federal Rules of Criminal Proceeither before or after the
dure as well. Discovery may occur
31
granting of an evidentiary hearing. '
308. See Habeas Corpus Rule 4 (§ 2254), Advisory Committee Note,
supra note 291 (discussion in connection with § 2254 answers is equally ap-

plicable to § 2255).

309. See Womack v. United States, 395 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
310. See text accompanying notes 260-270 supra.

311. Rules 7,which provide for expansion of the record, are hoped by the
drafters of the Rules to avoid much of the need for at least pre-hearing discovery. This, however, should not discourage the use of discovery when
appropriate, Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977).
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If necessary for effective utilization of discovery, the court
may appoint counsel to conduct discovery under the provisions
of the Criminal Justice Act. 312 This will normally be necessary
since a request for discovery must be accompanied by either a
statement of the interrogatories or requests for admission, and a
313
list of the documents, if any, sought to be produced.
If the respondent is granted leave to take the deposition of
the petitioner, movant, or any other person, the court may condition the right to take it on paying the expenses of travel and subsistence and fees of counsel for the petitioner or movant to
attend such taking. Though the court is not required to impose
that condition, the ability to do so may protect the indigent petitioner who otherwise might be prejudiced by his inability to
have counsel present at the taking of the deposition. An additional reason for this provision is that the funds available under
the Criminal Justice Act for court-appointed counsel are minimal. Counsel may receive in a habeas proceeding or for posttrial motions only $250 and reimbursement for expenses reasonably incurred. This provision cannot adequately reimburse
counsel for extensive deposition or prehearing proceedings.
Habeas Corpus Rules 6(c) (sections 2254 and 2255) now make
this additional form of compensation available.
The Advisory Committee Notes state that while the Rule is
silent about costs when a petitioner wishes to depose someone,
it is assumed that a petitioner, who qualifies for appointment of
counsel under the Criminal Justice Act, will be allowed witness
costs, including the recording and transcription of the deposition.314
The drafters of the Rules considered but rejected the view
that respondent should not be allowed to depose the petitioner
or movant. The Committee felt that the nature of the proceeding together with the safeguards of the fifth amendment and the
presence of counsel justified this allowance. This language by
the Advisory Committee clarifies the drafter's intent that where
discovery is utilized, counsel must be appointed. Otherwise,
the sentence in Habeas Corpus Rules 6(a) (sections 2254 and
2255) is ambiguous by stating that counsel shall be appointed if
"necessary for effective utilization of discovery procedures."
312. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g) (1976).
313. See Habeas Corpus Rule 6(b) (§ 2254), supra note 291.
314. 28 U.S.C. § 1825 (1976). Opinion of Comptroller General, February
28, 1974.
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Expansion of Record

Habeas Corpus Rule 7 (sections 2254 and 2255) provide that
where a petition or motion is not summarily dismissed, the
judge may direct that the record be expanded. Rule 7 (section
2254) provides that this may include, without limitation, letters
predating the filing of the petition in the district court, documents, exhibits, answers under oath to written interrogatories
propounded by the judge, or affidavits. Rule 7 (section 2255) is
not so specific because it assumes that most of this information
will already be in the record. A section 2255 judge, however, has
the same power to expand the record, if he deems it warranted.
Where the judge directs an expanded record, copies of all
documents proposed to be included must be submitted to the
opposing party who shall then be afforded an opportunity to admit or deny their correctness. Since affidavits may also be submitted, presumably documents may not only be "admitted" or
"denied" but also controverted. In this respect the court may
315
require the authentication of any submitted material.
The rationale for expanding the record is to eliminate unnecessary hearings. Even where a hearing is still required, the
issues to be litigated should be considerably narrowed.
9.

Evidentiary Hearing

If a petitioner or movant survives summary dismissal under
Rule 4 of sections 2254 and 2255, dismissal pursuant to any motion fied by the respondent, dismissal after the answer and petition (or motion) are considered, or dismissal after consideration
of the pleadings, expanded record, or any discovery, then the
court reaches the question under Habeas Corpus Rules 8 (sections 2254 and 2255)-whether it must hold a hearing. The standard to be applied is: "[wjhere the facts are in dispute, the
federal court in habeas corpus must hold an evidentiary hearing
if the habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary
hearing in a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a
3 16
collateral proceeding."
In Blackledge v. Allison,317 the Supreme Court overturned
the summary dismissal of a habeas petition where the allegations of the petition were not vague and conclusory but the record of trial court proceedings was ambiguous. The Court stated:
In short, it may turn out upon remand that a full evidentiary hearing is not required [because the use of discovery on an expanded
315. See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2246, 2447 (1976).
316. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1962).
317. 431 U.S. 63 (1977).
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record has clarified that no genuine issue of fact exists]. But Allison is "entitled to careful consideration and plenary processing of
including full opportunity for presentation of the rele[his claim] 318
vant facts."
An evidentiary hearing will be mandatory pursuant to section 2254(d) where the petitioner establishes, or it otherwise appears, or respondent admits that at the state court hearing: (1)
the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved; (2) that the
fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (3) that the material facts
were not adequately developed; (4) that the state court lacked
jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the person of the applicant; (5) that the applicant was an indigent and the state court
in deprivation of his constitutional rights failed to appoint counsel to represent him; (6) that the applicant did not receive a full,
fair and adequate hearing; (7) that the applicant was otherwise
denied due process of law; or (8) the state court determination
of the factual issue in question is not fairly supported by the
record.
The district court will normally accept as correct the factual
determinations made by the state court, but may make its own
additional consistent findings. 31 9 A state court's factual deter320
minations may be set aside, however, if clearly erroneous.
The importance of complete findings of fact cannot be overemphasized. Recently, in White v. Finkbeiner,321 the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the petition and
remanded for an evidentiary hearing where two prior state court
determinations were inadequate.
The burden is on the petitioner when there has been a state
hearing to show that it was not a fair or adequate hearing for one
or more of the specifically enumerated reasons in order to force
a federal evidentiary hearing. The burden is, of course, on the
petitioner throughout the hearing.
Unlike section 2254 petitioners, there is no "mandatory" categorization of hearing requirements for section 2255 movants.
Nevertheless, the same general standards ought to apply. A
hearing would normally be required whenever material facts are
in dispute.
318. 431 U.S. at 82. See also Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 298 (1969);
Scott v. Estelle, 567 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1978).
319. Brewer v. Williams, 431 U.S. 925 (1977).

See also LaVallee v. DeUe
Rose, 410 U.S. 690 (1973) (if state court fails to articulate specific findings of
fact, federal court must assume state court found contested factual issues
against petitioner and that state court applied proper legal standards).
320. United States ex. Tel. Henne v. Fike, 563 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1977).
321. 570 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1978).
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If the .court determines that an evidentiary hearing is
neither required nor desirable, the court may make such disposition of the petition as justice dictates. 322 If no hearing is required, most petitions or motions will be dismissed. In an
unusual case the court can grant relief without a hearing, including immediate release from custody or nullification of a judg3 23
ment under which a sentence is to be served in the future.
Habeas Corpus Rules 8(b) (sections 2254 and 2255) authorize the federal courts, by local rule, to utilize the services of a
magistrate (28 U.S.C. section 636(b)) to conduct hearings on the
petition or motion, and to submit proposed findings of fact and
recommendations for disposition. If a magistrate is so utilized,
the proposed findings and recommendations must be filed with
the court, and a copy forwarded to all parties. Within ten days
after being served with a copy of the proposed findings and recommendations, any party may file and serve written objections.
The judge of the court will then make a de novo determination
324
of the proposed findings or recommendations objected to.
Regardless of whether objections are filed, the court is free to
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, any of the findings
or recommendations.
Habeas Corpus Rules 8(c) (sections 2254 and 2255) provide
for the appointment of counsel for any petitioner or movant
qualifying for an appointment under the Criminal Justice Act
when an evidentiary hearing is required. Rules 8(c) expressly
point out that this appointment of counsel at an evidentiary
hearing does not limit the appointment of counsel under the
stage of the proceeding if "the
Criminal Justice Act at any other
3 25
interest of justice" so requires.
322. Habeas Corpus Rule 8(a) (§ 2255), supra note 291.
323. Browder v. Director, Dep. of Corrections of Ill., 434 U.S. 257 (1978).
Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941). See text accompanying notes 300304 supra.

324. This does not mean that the judge must hold a de novo evidentiary
hearing. See House Report No. 941609 to Rule 8(§ 2254).
325. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g) (1976) permits compensation in a habeas proceeding up to a maximum of $250, plus reimbursement for expenses reasonably incurred, including investigation and expert assistance. Requests can
be made for investigative or expert assistance by ex parte application, 18
U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1976). It is advisable to make this request prior to incurring these expenses to preclude any risk that the expenses might not be
allowed, and to preclude application of the provision that $150 is the total
amount of money that will be available for services obtained without prior
authorization.
Counsel fees are also available under Rule 6(c) if the court orders respondent to reimburse counsel from state funds for fees and expenses incurred as a result of the utilization of discovery procedures by the
respondent. The Note is not clear, but it seems to assume that these fees or
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The Advisory Committee notes that appointment of counsel
under the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act may be available even when a petitioner does not meet the strict requirements for eligibility to prosecute the petition informapauperis
under 28 U.S.C. section 1915. No authority for this position is
apparent unless the Committee is attempting to suggest that a
partial informa pauperis proceeding is possible where a party
could meet minimal costs, but not all..
Habeas Corpus Rules 8(c) under both sections require that
the evidentiary hearing be conducted as promptly as possible.
It also cautions that the court should take specific notice of the
"need of counsel for both parties for adequate time for investigation and preparation." It appears that Rules 8(c) permit more
flexibility than available under prior law while insuring counsel
adequate time to use prehearing devices as discovery or expanded records.
The Habeas Corpus Rule 8 (section 2254) says nothing
about prehearing conferences, but the Advisory Committee
Note to this rule suggests that such a conference may be desirable to "limit the questions to be resolved, identify areas of agreement and dispute, and explore evidentiary problems that may
be expected to arise." It might also disclose that a hearing was
unnecessary. A court should use its discretion in determining
whether a prehearing conference might be useful. The Habeas
Corpus Rules do not contain a provision with regard to
subpoe326
naing witnesses. This matter is left to local practice.
10.

Delayed or Successive Petitions

As originally drafted Habeas Corpus Rules 9(a) (sections
2254 and 2255) provided that if a petition or motion was filed
more than five years after the judgment of conviction, there
would be a presumption of prejudice that the petitioner had to
overcome. Congress found this policy unfair and deleted that
language. Habeas Corpus Rules 9(a) (sections 2254 and 2255),
as passed, provide that a petition or motion may be dismissed if
it appears that the government has been prejudiced in its ability
to respond by the delay, unless petitioner or movant shows that
his pleading is based on grounds of which he could not have had
knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the
circumstances prejudicial to the government occurred. This
change by Congress is sound since facts in response to old
claims can more readily be discovered by the government than
expenses would be available to appointed counsel apart from the maximum
provisions.
326. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1825 (1976).
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327

Habeas Corpus Rules 9(b) (sections 2254 and 2255) authorize the dismissal of a second or successive petition or motion if
the court finds: (1) the pleading fails to allege new or different
grounds for relief, and the prior determination was on the merits; or (2) if new and different grounds are alleged, the court
finds that the failure to assert those grounds in a prior pleading
328
constitutes an abuse of the proceeding.
The burden is on the government to show that there was an
abuse of the writ or proceeding.3 29 If met, the petitioner then
has the burden of proving that he did not abuse the writ.33 0 A
court cannot dismiss a petition or motion for abuse unless peti33
tioner ,has been given the chance to respond and explain. '

Thus, the government's claim must be stated with particularity
so petitioner is able to respond.
Examples of abuse of the writ, stated by the Advisory Committee, are as follows:
For example, a successive application, already decided on the merits, may be submitted in the hope of getting before a different judge
in multijudge courts. A known ground may be deliberately withheld in the hope of getting two or more hearings or in the hope that
the delay will result in witnesses and records being lost. There are
instances in which a petitioner will have three or four petitions
pending at the same time in the same court. There are many hundreds of cases 332
where the application is at least the second one by
the petitioner.
The Note recognizes that abuse is the exception rather than the
rule. It also realizes that there are instances in which a petitioner's failure to assert a ground in a prior petition is clearly
excusable.
The more common instances are a retroactive
change in the law or newly discovered evidence.
In rare instances, a court may even feel a need to entertain a
petition alleging grounds previously decided on the merits. In
327. See, e.g., Bartlett v. United States, 574 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1978) (§
2255 motion ified 35 years after conviction, evidentiary hearing granted).
328. Rules 9(b) as originally promulgated permitted a judge to dismiss a
second or successive pleading even if it alleged new and different grounds
for relief if the court found that the failure to assert those grounds in a prior
petition was "not excusable." Congress deleted the "not excusable" standard because it felt that the language created a new and undefined standard
"that gave a judge too broad a discretion to dismiss a second or a successive
petition." The substitution of an abuse of a writ or procedure standard conforms the rule to existing law. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1976).
329. See Sanders v. United States, 371 U.S. 1 (1963). But cf. Galtieri v.
Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1978).
330. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
331. Johnson v. Copinger, 420 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1969).
332. Habeas Corpus Rule 9 (§ 2254), Advisory Committee Note, supra
note 291.
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Sanders v. United States,33 3 the Supreme Court held that the
denial of a prior federal habeas corpus petition would bar a second petition or motion only if: (1) the same ground presented in
the subsequent application had been determined adversely to
the applicant on the prior application, (2) the prior determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be
served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application. If
there is doubt as to whether separate grounds are raised, it
should be resolved in petitioner-movant's favor. If the determination of the prior petition is not on the merits, a successive petition may not be dismissed. In rare cases where the first two
requirements are met, the court may wish to redetermine an issue where there was not a full and fair hearing on the prior petition, or there has been an intervening change in law, or some
other justification for failure to raise a particular argument or
issue in the prior petition. Still, the standards of Rules 9(b) are
subject to a claim that the petitioner-movant's successive pleading is an abuse of the procedure.
11.

Powers of Magistrates

Habeas Corpus Rules 10 (sections 2254 and 2255) provide
that a magistrate may be empowered to perform all of the duties
imposed upon a judge by Rules 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 (to the extent he is
empowered by local rule) except he cannot order a dismissal of
the motion or petition under Habeas Corpus Rules 4. Where
such an order is involved, the magistrate shall submit to the
court his report as to the facts and his recommendation with respect to the order to be made by the court.334 The order, if
given, must be made by the Court.
12. Applicability of FederalRules of Civil and Criminal
Procedure
Habeas Corpus Rules 11 (section 2254) and 12 (section 2255)
provide that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent
that they are not inconsistent, may be applied when appropriate
to habeas corpus proceedings under these Rules. Habeas
is intended to codify the
Corpus Rule 11 (section 2254)
Supreme Court's opinion in Harris v. Nelson,33 5 that courts
should be free to exercise judicial discretion in formulating
rules and procedures for habeas corpus proceedings, and to
adopt the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure where their use
seems appropriate. An example of an inappropriate use is
333. 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
334. See text accompanying notes 316-326 supra.
335. 394 U.S. 286 (1969).
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There the Court held that Federal Rule

60(b) of Civil Procedure should not apply in a habeas case when
it would alter the statutory exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C.

337
section 2254.
In Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections of

Illinois,338 the Court held Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
52(b) (10-day limit on amending judgments) and 59 (new trials,
amendment of judgments) applicable to habeas corpus proceedings. The Court opted for "settled conformity" for habeas and
"with respect to time limits on postjudgother civil proceedings
339
ment relief."
Habeas Corpus Rule 12 (section 2255) differs from Rule 11
(section 2254), because it includes the Rules of Criminal Procedure as well as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as sources
to be drawn on where appropriate.
13.

Presence of Petitioner

28 U.S.C. section 2243 requires that, if the court is going to
hold an evidentiary hearing, petitioner be present. No comparable provision for section 2255 proceedings exists, though the
same general admonitions should be relevant. The precise language in section 2243 states that "[u]nless the application for
the writ and the return present only issues of law the person to
whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the
hearing the body of the person detained." 30 Thus, once the
court has determined to hold an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner, with the exception noted, must be present.
Although a petitioner is not required by law to be present at
a hearing involving only issues of law or in a section 2255 proceeding, it would still be advisable to require it, particularly
where no substantial difficulty and expense are involved. Such
a requirement ensures to petitioner-movant's satisfaction that
there has been a full and fair hearing with all favorable arguments having been presented. This elementary fairness serves
as protection for both the court and counsel.
336. 421 U.S. 482 (1975).

337. This does not mean that Rule 60(b) may not be

appropriate circumstances.
of Ill., 434 U.S. 257 (1978).
338. 434 U.S. 257 (1978).
339. Id. at 271.

applicable in other
Cf. Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections

340. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1976).
(1941).

See also Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275
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Stay of State Court Proceedings

28 U.S.C. section 2251 provides that a justice or judge before
whom a habeas corpus (section 2254) proceeding is pending
may, either before final judgment or after final judgment of discharge, or pending appeal, stay any proceeding against the person detained in any state court involving matters which are also
raised in the habeas corpus proceeding. This statutory authorization refers to state court proceedings, not service of sentence.341
This provision is infrequently used. It has been resorted to
in order to stay the execution of a death sentence. 342 In Jackson
v. Justices of Superior Court of Massachusetts,343 a district court
stayed the state trials of certain juveniles pending determination of their claim that the very occurrence of the trials would
subject them to double jeopardy. There is no comparable statutory provision for section 2255 proceedings, but it is difficult to
imagine a situation in which it would be required.
15.

Appeal of Section 2254 Proceedings--Certificateof

Probable Cause
An appeal from a section 2254 order may not be taken to the
court of appeals unless the justice or judge who rendered the
order or a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of probable
cause.344 This is a statement by a judge that there exists probable cause to appeal. This requirement ensures that the appeal
will not be frivolous. The certificate is required only when a petitioner in state custody seeks to appeal; it is not required if the
respondent seeks to appeal. Once the certificate is issued, the
45
court of appeals must hear the appeal.3
Appeals in habeas corpus proceedings are governed by the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. A notice of appeal must
be filed within thirty days after judgment is entered. 346 The notice of appeal is jurisdictional,347 and hence should be filed even
though a certificate of probable cause has not yet been obtained
341. Kleczka v. Massachusetts, 259 F. Supp. 462 (D. Mass. 1966).
342. Cf. Reese v. Teets, 248 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1957) (vacated stay of execution entered erroneously where district court lacked jurisdiction because
of failure to exhaust remedies).
343. 423 F. Supp. 50 (D. Mass. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 549 F.2d 215
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 975 (1977).

344. 28 U.S.C. §2253 (1976).
345. Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U.S. 542 (1967).
346. FED. R. App. P. 3, 4.
347. Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of IlM., 434 U.S. 257 (1978);
Hayward v. Britt, 572 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1978).
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from either the district court or the circuit court. While some
older authority required both the certificate and the notice of
appeal be filed within thirty days,3 48 modern cases take a realistic view that allows the notice of appeal to be filed and later supplemented with the certificate.3 9 The modern approach will
relieve the time pressures placed on district and circuit court
judges to issue certificates which may have been requested at
the last minute, and it will also prevent the technical loss of an
appeal by habeas corpus petitioners.
16.

Appeal of Section 2255 Proceedings

Since a section 2255 proceeding is part of the original criminal proceeding, the time for appeal is governed by Federal Rule
4(b) of Appellate Procedure. An appeal must be fied within ten
days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from. This
time period may be extended not to exceed thirty days, upon a
showing of excusable neglect. In order to appeal, a movant
need not obtain a certificate of probable cause as is required for
a section 2254 proceeding, but may appeal as of right.
Habeas Corpus Rule 11 (section 2255) provides that nothing
in the Rules shall be construed as extending the time to appeal
from the original judgment of conviction. Thus, the filing of a
section 2255 action does not extend the normal time period for
ten
appeal. An appeal from a conviction must be filed within
350
days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
17. Representative Habeas Corpus Proceedings--Class
Actions
Habeas corpus proceedings in the nature of class actions are
useful vehicles to resolve certain kinds of issues. There should
be no question about the propriety of this type of action since
Habeas Corpus Rule 11 (section 2254) and Habeas Corpus Rule
12 (section 2255) expressly permit the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to be adopted to the extent that they may be useful.
Generally, representative habeas corpus proceedings are required to meet the eligibility standards of Federal Rule 23(a)
and (b) of Civil Procedure. Other technical requirements, as
notice, may not be insisted upon unless it would serve a useful
348. See Sagaser v. Sigler, 374 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1967); United States ex
rel. Geach v. Ragen, 231 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1956). The Seventh Circuit has
not overruled the Geach case, but the Seventh Circuit Clerk has informed
the authors that the Circuit no longer follows that practice.
349. Klier v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1129 (1973); Fitzsimmons v. Yeager, 391 F.2d 849 (3d Cir.) cert. denied,
393 U.S. 868 (1968).
350. FED. R. App. P. 4(b).
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purpose in the context of the habeas proceeding. Conversely,
the requirements of Habeas Corpus Rules 2(c) (section 2254)
and 2(b) (section 2255) that each petitioner or movant sign and
swear to a petition or motion will1 be relaxed where the court
35
permits a class-type proceeding.
The kinds of situations in which a habeas corpus class action may be useful are illustrated in the cases utilizing the procedure. In United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser,352 the
petitioners were young adults challenging sentences of up to
four years as juvenile offenders where, if adults, the sentence
would be only one year. United States ex rel. Morgan v.
353
involved a suit on behalf of all persons committed
Sielaff
under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act that required a standard of proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt. Williams v.
Richardson354 involved a challenge to conditions of confinement
at a United States Medical Center. Mead v. Parker35 5 involved
a refusal to provide inmates with access to legal materials.
Class proceedings are available under either section 2254 or
section 2255.356 In a section 2255 proceeding, however, relief
may be limited to those persons within the court's territorial ju35 7
risdiction at the time of filing.
18.

FederalRule 23 of Appellate Procedure-MattersPending

Review
There is no provision in the Habeas Corpus Rules governing
the transfer of a petitioner pending initial decision of his petition. It is Federal Rule 23(a) of Appellate Procedure that prohibits the transfer of a petitioner pending review of a decision in
a habeas corpus proceeding. The Rule does, however, provide
that upon showing a need therefor, the custodian of the petitioner may obtain an order authorizing a transfer. If granted,
the order will substitute the successor custodian as a named
party.
The court, judge, or justice who initially considers a habeas
corpus petition has no power to release the petitioner or admit
him to bail pending a ruling on the petition. Once a decision,
351. See United States ex. rel. Morgan v. Sielaff, 546 F.2d 218 (7th Cir.
1976); United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975) (discussing habeas corpus class actions).
352. 506 F.2d 1115 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975).
353. 546 F.2d 218 (7th Cir. 1976).
354. 481 F.2d 358 (8th Cir. 1973).
355. 464 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1972).
356. United States ex rel. Morgan v. Sielaff, 546 F.2d 218 (7th Cir. 1976);
Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1975).
357. Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975).
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however, has been made on the petition, other options become
available. Federal Rule 23(b) of Appellate Procedure provides
that pending review of a decision refusing to release a petitioner, (1) the petitioner may be detained in the custody from
which release is sought; (2) the petitioner may be released on
his own recognizance, or with or without surety, as may appear
fitting. This decision may be made by the court or judge rendering the initial decision, by the court of appeals or the Supreme
Court, or by a judge or a justice of either court.
If the initial decision orders the release of the petitioner,
then Federal Rule 23(c) of Appellate Procedure states that petitioner shall be released upon his own recognizance, with or
without surety. It is thus presumed that petitioner should be
released. This rule further provides that a court or justice or
judge rendering the decision, or the court of appeals or the
Supreme Court, or any judge or justice thereof, may otherwise
order.
Federal Rule 23(d) of Appellate Procedure provides that
whatever the initial order is respecting custody, it shall continue
to govern in all courts, unless for special reasons shown to a subsequent court, judge, or justice the order should be modified or
an independent order respecting custody, enlargement, or
surety should be made. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
23 (d) does not, however, deprive the district court of jurisdiction
to review its custody or bail orders during the pendency of an
appeal. Indeed, the district court may have a special obligation
to modify, if circumstances require, an order the court of appeals might otherwise consider at least morally binding under
that rule.358
C. Procedure Governing Habeas Corpus Proceedings
Pursuantto 28 U.S.C. Section 2241
All habeas corpus proceedings concerning state prisoners
will be brought in federal court under 28 U.S.C. section 2254. Although 28 U.S.C. section 2255 is supposed to be as broad as section 2254 in terms of providing habeas corpus relief for federal
prisoners, there exist situations where a federal prisoner may
not bring a section 2255 proceeding. Under these circumstances, the federal courts permit a federal prisoner to file a writ
of habeas corpus that the courts consider as a section 2241 writ.
The procedure governing this writ is contained in sections 2241
through 2253.3 59 These are the same statutory proceedings that
358. Jago v. United States District Court, 570 F.2d 618 (6th Cir. 1978).
359. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2253 (1976).
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had governed section 2254 proceedings, which are now governed
by the Habeas Corpus Rules together with whatever portions of
these statutes that are not inconsistent therewith. A section
2241 proceeding, however, will be governed solely by the statutes.
The procedure of section 2241 is to submit a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme Court, and a justice
thereof, the district courts, and any circuit judge. Actually, the
petition is to be filed with the district court in the first instance,
since the other courts will send it back there in any event. The
petition may be filed in the district of confinement or conviction.
As a practical matter, though not governed by statute, the proceeding will probably be transferred to the court with the
greater proximity to the alleged problem-the court of confinement if the complaint relates to conditions of confinement; the
court of conviction if the complaint relates to trial or conviction.
The petition shall be in writing, signed, and verified by the
person seeking relief, or by someone on his behalf. It shall allege facts concerning his commitment or detention, and the
name of the person who has custody over him and the authority
of that person to do so. This petition may be amended or supplemented as provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the petition is addressed in the first instance to an appellate
court judge or justice, the petition shall state the reasons why it
was not first submitted to the district court.
Section 2243 provides for summary dismissal where it appears from the petition that the applicant is not entitled thereto.
Otherwise, the writ shall be issued or the court or judge or justice shall direct the respondent to show cause why it should not
be granted. The writ shall be directed to the person having custody of the detainee, and it must be returned within three days
unless good cause is shown, in which case an additional twenty
days may be allowed.
The person to whom the writ is directed shall make a return
(answer) certifying the true cause of the detention. When the
writ is returned (answered), a date shall be set for hearing not
more than five days after the return unless good cause for additional time is shown. The applicant for the writ must be
brought to the hearing unless it is clear that only issues of law
are involved.
The applicant for the writ must deny any of the facts set
forth in the return, or allege alternative facts; otherwise under
section 2248 (unless the judge otherwise finds), the facts set
forth in the answer shall be accepted as true. As evidenced
from the above timetables, all this must be done in a brief period
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of time. The only saving grace to the time strictures is that the
return and any reply may be amended by leave of court, before
or after being filed. The court will then summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matters "as law and justice
require."
28 U.S.C. section 2244 deals with successive petitions. It
states that no circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus if the legality of
such detention has been previously determined by a judge or
court of the United States, the petition presents no new ground,
and the judge or court is satisfied that the ends of justice will not
be served by such inquiry.
Where an evidentiary hearing has been previously held, the
standards are slightly stricter. A court or judge need not consider a successive application where an evidentiary hearing on
the merits of a material factual issue has been held, unless it is
predicated on a ground not adjudicated in the earlier hearing
and the court is satisfied that the applicant did not deliberately
withhold the newly asserted ground, or otherwise abuse the
writ.
Where a record is not available, section 2245 provides that
the certificate of the trial judge setting forth the facts occurring
at the trial, shall be admissible in evidence. Copies of this
certificate must be fied with the court in which the application
is pending and with the court in which the trial took place.
28 U.S.C. section 2246 provides that on the application for a
writ, evidence may be taken orally or by deposition, or in the
discretion of the judge by affidavit. If affidavits are submitted,
the opposing party may propound written interrogatories to the
affiants or file answering affidavits. In addition, documentary
evidence pursuant to section 2247 will be admissible, such as
transcripts of proceedings upon arraignment, plea and sentence,
and the transcript of the oral testimony introduced on any previous similar application.
If petitioner fails to attach to his petition copies of the indictment, plea and judgment, or such of them as may be material to his application, then the respondent shall file certified
copies of those items with his return to the writ, or answer to an
60
order to show cause.3
An indigent petitioner is entitled to prosecute his application for a writ of habeas corpus in forma pauperis, and the
United States shall furnish to the petitioner without cost certified copies of such documents or parts of the record as may be
360. 28 U.S.C. § 2249 (1976).
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required by order of the judge before whom the application is
pending. 36 1
28 U.S.C. section 2251 allows for a stay of state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. section 2252 apparently requires, prior to
the hearing of the habeas corpus proceeding on behalf of a person who is presently in the custody of state officers, even though
his habeas goes to a federal conviction, that notice be given to
the attorney general or other appropriate officer of the state, as
the justice or judge at the time of issuing the writ shall direct.
This provision may be obsolete, but is nevertheless still law.
A habeas corpus proceeding before a circuit or district judge
is appealable as of right under 28 U.S.C. section 2253. No appeal
as of right lies, however, from such an order in a proceeding to
test the validity of a warrant to remove to another jurisdiction or
district, or place for committment or trial a person charged with
a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of his detention pending removal proceedings.

361. 28 U.S.C. § 2250 (1976).

